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Some people refer to i t  as “gaming”; others refer to it  as 
“gambling”. The mere fact of what  you call it , could reveal your 
standpoint  and it  reminds me of the philosophical thesis 
whether the glass is half  full, or half  empty. The truth lies in 
the eyes of the beholder. 
 
 
  
Abstract  
The European Community is based upon the principle of free movement of the four 
freedoms, and aims to create one internal in which measures of harmonizat ion are 
ut il ized. Thus, principally, a monopoly as the Swedish gambling monopoly is 
contrary to this object ive. Nonetheless, the Treaty on the European Union provides 
derogations based on public policy, public security and public health. Gambling has, 
so far, not been the object of any harmonizat ion init iat ive within the European 
Union. 
In brief , the rulings of  the European Court of  Just ice have shown that  the nat ional 
monopolies are indeed infringing on European Law, and it  was not unt il in Schindler 
these arguments were developed for the f irst  t ime in connect ion with gambling 
services. However, no violat ion wil l be established if  a restrict ive legislat ion can be 
just if ied by object ives of social policy and consumer protect ion aimed at limit ing the 
harmful effects of  gambling act ivit ies, and if  the restrict ions are non- discriminatory 
and proport ionate to these object ives. Moreover, according to Gambelli, the raising 
of  money for good causes cannot  in itself  just ify a restrict ive policy. The case also 
pointed out that  the nat ional gambling restrict ions are only acceptable according to 
the Treaty if  they ref lect a concern to bring about  a genuine diminut ion in gambling 
opportunit ies and if  the f inancing of good causes, or of the state, const itutes an 
incidental beneficial consequence. The Member States have so far enjoyed a large 
discret ionary power in regulat ing gambling, but the discret ionary power is not  
limited by the fact that  other Member States have regulated games of chance in a 
more liberal way. Since it  is for the nat ional court  to determine whether the 
legislat ion serves the aims which might just ify it  and if  it  is proport ional, dif ferent  
nat ional courts have been making dif ferent interpretat ions.  
Many gambling monopolies today act more like a private business rather than a 
company with a public health mandate. In order to avoid risking dissolut ion of  
monopolist ic structures, the state authorized companies may have to modify or 
perhaps withdraw from certain areas, products or market ing campaigns. In the light  
of  recent  cases in nat ional courts of Holland and Germany, it  appears that a state 
which act ively seeks to st imulate demand for gambling products, either through the 
development of new gambling games; the opening up of new channels of  
dist ribut ion; or the roll out of aggressive market ing campaigns, could have some 
dif f iculty just ifying its nat ional gambling restrict ions. The Swedish gambling 
monopoly has, so far by the Swedish Courts, not been seen as one of those; however 
there are strong indicat ions point ing towards the opposite. 
The focus has increasingly ended up on legal interpretat ions around the possibilit ies 
of , and the obstacles for, state regulat ion and has recently placed Nordic gambling 
monopolies under scrut iny. Most of  the Nordic countries are under pressure as 
private operators have inst igated object ions against the state monopolies in several 
jurisdict ions. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Int roduct ion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Internet  gambling companies are, to this date, a small group of  companies that  have 
managed to sustain prof itable beyond the so called “Internet bubble”. Not many 
years ago, investors were throwing money at “dot.com companies” that were nothing 
more than a business plan predict ing future prof its in correlat ion with the projected 
increased Internet  access throughout  the world. The ever- expanding accessibility of 
the Internet has led to increasing opportunit ies for gambling and, in part icular, 
cross- border gambling. This growth continues with limited, if  any, support  from 
many governments throughout the world in the form of effect ive regulatory 
schemes. In most of the European jurisdict ions, gambling is st rict ly controlled by the 
nat ional governments. National gambling monopolies ex ist in several countries. This 
means that the same hand supplying gambling is regulat ing it . At  the same t ime the 
monopolist ic structure of gambling is being quest ioned, both on the nat ional and 
internat ional arena, due to an increased pressure of general deregulat ion and 
harmonizat ion within the European Union. 
In Sweden, ATG and Svenska Spel AB, has a concession1 to provide gambling services 
according to the Lotteries Act. As a result , they can dictate price, supply and all 
other relevant  condit ions concerning their offer. Moreover, there is a lot of money to 
be made without competit ion, approx imately  75 bill ions in annual turnover in 
Europe2, even though this industry, for the f irst  t ime in years, is facing decreased 
growth. Further, it  has been noted that  Internet poker has increased 600 percent  
during the period November, 2003 to November, 2004.3 
                                              
1
 This permission is given by the Swedish government  according to the Lottery Act . 
2
 Ayolt  Z., (2005). 
3
 2005/ 06:KrU3. 
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One of  the European Union’s main object ives is to create one internal market. On 
one hand, the state owned companies, or the Member States to be precise, do not  
want one European market in this aspect. On the other hand, gambling companies 
such as Ladbrokes, Unibet, Betfair etc wants a piece of the billion Euro market. 
Member states argue that gambling must be state controlled in order to secure the 
protect ion of general interests, such as, public policy, public security and public 
health. Gambling companies argue that the Member States are benef it ing their 
public purses and that  gambling companies could shield many of the general 
interests asserted by the Member States. Actually, in comparison to alcohol for 
example, there are far more countries that have some kind of regulated gambling 
market with the stated purpose of protect ing cit izens from harm, restrict ing criminal 
behaviour and for the purpose of f inancially benefit ing public interest. 
The focus has increasingly ended up on legal interpretat ions around the possibilit ies 
of , and the obstacles for, state regulat ion and has recently placed Nordic gambling 
monopolies under scrut iny. Most of  the Nordic countries are under pressure as 
private operators have inst igated object ions against the state monopolies in several 
jurisdict ions. 
The European Union has addressed the need for legislat ive act ion to avoid future 
distort ions of the internal market by init iat ing the so called “Report on gambling” 
(planned publishing November 2005), reviewing the E- commerce Direct ive for the 
second t ime as well as debating the proposal for a Services Direct ive in the European 
Parliament (January, 2006). Any subsequent legislat ive proposal in this f ield will 
be the result  of a complex debate between the diverging interests of the European 
Union, nat ional monopolies and private operators; the balance between the defence 
and promotion of the freedom to provide services in the internal market, the loss 
of  revenues or jobs in the industry and the need to combat fraud and money 
laundering, prevent gambling addict ion and protect consumers. 
1.2 Purpose and Quest ions of Research 
This paper, intends to discuss the European Community regulat ions that concern the 
Swedish gambling monopoly. Most important  aspects of the Treaty are the freedom 
to provide services and the freedom of  establishment. The object ive with this paper 
is to answer following quest ions: 
1. What is the law in force concerning gambling monopolies within the 
European Community and Sweden respect ively? 
2. Is the Swedish monopoly in breach of any provision(s) of the Treaty? 
a) If  aff irmative, can it / they be just if ied? 
3. Under what circumstances could the monopoly cont inue to ex ist?  
4. What circumstances could undermine the monopoly? 
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1.3 Delimitat ions 
I have delimited this paper to apply law in force on the Swedish gambling monopoly. 
I will not  enter deeply into the Member States’  nat ional regulat ions or into the 
regulatory discrepancies between them within the European Community, except  for 
when it  is necessary in order to understand a case or an argumentat ion etcetera. The 
purpose is not to elaborate other Member States’  law in force. However, by looking 
at the oddity among the Member States’  regulat ions, one can enlighten and 
understand the case law within the European Community. A relevant  quest ion, more 
of  a formal nature, is when a nat ional Court should be obliged to refer a matter to 
the European Court of Just ice, but it  will brief ly be addressed. For purpose of this 
paper, the quest ions set forth in this report  will be examined through the 
supranational approach, which means that  the Swedish gambling monopoly is 
imposed EC- law, and could very likely be considered in breach of the same.  The 
opposite approach, the interstate approach regards the Member States as the 
masters of  the Treaty, whereby the quest ions set forth in this report would not even 
be an issue.  
1.4 Method 
In order to answer the proposed quest ions, I have studied the Treaty, Direct ives and 
proposals of the same, Commission reports as well as other sources from the 
European Community. Addit ionally, since the regulatory framework has proven 
insuf f icient , the European Court of Just ice has some case law in this quest ion. In 
conjunct ion to this, nat ional European case law has been examined too. Most of the 
facts of  company nature have been acquired f rom public documentat ions and 
appreciat ions, since some of the most interest ing facts, very lit t le surprising, are 
conf ident ial. 
1.5 Disposit ion 
This paper is predisposed as follows. Chapter II explains the European f ramework 
and its purpose is to elucidate the law in force within Europe. This will be conducted 
by examining the Direct ives and proposals of Services and E- commerce. In addit ion, 
the European case law will thoroughly be examined. Chapter III addresses the 
Swedish framework and const itutes the background for the quest ions of  research. In 
Chapter IV an analysis is made whether the Swedish gambling monopoly is in 
conjunct ion with, or in breach of, the Treaty on the European Union/ Community. In 
this last chapter, the quest ions set  forth in this report will be answered as well. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
European Framework 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Background 
Already in the early 1990s, the European Commission (hereinaf ter the Commission) 
demonstrated a certain interest in the “gambling sector” since its substant ial 
economic importance and potent ial.4 The Member States were of the opinion that the 
regulat ion of casino games, lotteries and other types of games was an exclusive 
Member State’ s matter. When the Commission, in 1992, f irst  addressed a European 
gambling regulat ion it  underlined that a legislat ive init iat ive could not be excluded, 
even if  i t  was not  required. Given the fact  that  technological developments open up 
markets worldwide and the Community becomes ever more closely integrated, it  
could not be precluded that the Commission wil l have to reconsider its posit ion in 
view of new and as yet unforeseeable trends.5 The wording “unforeseeable trends” 
aims at  the information society, most manifest ly demonstrated by the growth of the 
Internet , a society, as we all know, without geographical front iers. 
In the view of most governmental regulators, online gambling is probably the wild 
wild west of the gambling world. Online or Internet  gambling is largely unregulated, 
and in fact illegal in many countries. There are basically three dist inct regulatory 
schemes for Internet  gambling.6 The f irst  scheme, pract ised by countries like the 
United States and Switzerland, is to out law Internet gambling, because Internet  
gambling undermines gambling policies, may compete with state lotteries, and 
cannot be easily taxed.7 Other countries, like Great Britain and Australia have taken a 
dif ferent approach by expressly authorizing gambling, controlling it , and tax ing it .8 
                                              
4
 IP (91)904. 
5
 IP (92)1120. 
6 See Fridolin W., (2000). 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid. 
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Under a third type of approach, many European count ries throw moralist ic concerns 
to the wind by running their own gambling concessions. Gambling is a good 
example of how dif ferent  the point of attacks can be between countries. 
Since March 7, 2001, Great Britain has essent ially been the pioneer of the global 
gambling industry. The move was to dump the tax  on sports bett ing in exchange for 
a pledge by its famed bookmakers to shut down their offshore Internet  operat ions 
and reopen them at home. The change of the tax  code made Britain the f irst  world 
power to embrace Internet gambling.9 
2.2 The Core of the European Community  
The European Union (hereinafter the EU) was founded to avoid future similar 
incidents to the world wars, and by polit ical and economical unif icat ion, the EU seeks 
to attain long and prosperous peace. Sweden became a member of the EU January 1, 
1995 and has ever since been resigned to EC- law10. The European Union embraces 
more than the economical f ield but in this regard, by looking at gambling as an 
act ivity, it  must  be considered to have an economical impact in order to be affected 
by the Treaty. Hence, the quest ion if  the act ivity is economical will therefore be the 
f irst  step in the analysis of this paper, see sect ion 4.1.1 Does the Regulat ion 
Concerned Relate to an Economic Act ivity. 
Fundamental to the European Community (hereinaf ter the EC) is to have one internal 
market whereas goods, persons, services and capital can move freely across the 
nat ional borders within the EC. All obstacles to competit ion, establishment, 
providing and receiving the freedoms, are aimed to be overcome. However, wherever 
there are main rules, there are except ions as well. In this chapter, I will  emphasize 
on the European case law since it  is the single most important source of law 
regarding gambling. 
2.3 Legal Principles 
There are some fundamental legal principles within the EC- law, to which the 
European Court  of Just ice often refers. As the Treaty has many loopholes, these 
principles const itute a very important  tool in the interpretat ion. In order to 
understand the case law later in this chapter, the basic and most relevant legal 
principles will be out lined. The general legal principles that derive f rom the Treaty 
are the principles of legality, loyalty, non discriminat ion equality, subsidiarity and 
proport ionality. Principle derived by case law is the principle of overriding reasons; 
see sect ion 2.6.2 Principle of Overriding Reasons of General Interest. 
                                              
9
 Brunker, M., (2004). 
10
 The four freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, services and capital or somet imes even f ive 
when referr ing to the freedom of establishment ) derive from the EC- Treaty. The EC- Treaty derives from 
EEC (European Economic Community), ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) and Euratom (Treaty on 
atom energy). The Union structure fashioned at  Maastricht  is built  on three pillars whereas the European 
Communit ies are one of those three. The other two are:  CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and 
JHA (Cooperat ion in the Fields of Just ice and Home Affairs). 
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2.3.1Principle of Non Discrimination 
The principle of non discriminat ion implies that  every attempt to discriminate based 
on nat ionality is prohibited and it  is expressed in art icle 12 of the Treaty. It  states 
that natural and legal person of a Member State shall be t reated as residents and 
companies in other Member States. ECJ has several t imes stated the Treaty not only 
to prohibit  direct (open) discriminat ion, but also indirect (hidden) discriminat ion and 
the latter can be manifested through illusionary regulat ions not  target ing at  
nat ionality, but for instance unjust if ied requirements of sett lement or language. 
Therefore, this is one of the cornerstones of the EC striving for an internal market  
which is based upon an open market  economy with free competit ion. The 
discriminat ing effect of  an indirect discriminat ion can however be considered as a 
merely accidental occurrence if  the negative effect is object ive in proport ion to i ts 
aim and based on other than the nat ionality of the effected economical act ivity.11 
2.3.2Principle of Proport ionality 
This principle is elucidated in art icle 5.3 of the Treaty whereas “(A)ny act ion by the 
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the object ives of  this 
Treaty.” It  means that  act ions taken by EC inst itut ions, to achieve a certain object ive, 
are not to be more burdensome or far- reaching than necessary for achieving the 
object ive.12 In the event of choosing from several act ions striving to achieve an 
object ive, the least  burdensome should be chosen.13 The principle expresses a 
balance between means and object ives, and ECJ often refers to the phrase 
“appropriate and necessary”.  
Act ions prohibit ing gambling services must be considered proport ional in order for 
the Member States to cont inue to keep their trade barriers. However, there is some 
uncertainty regarding what the principle really const itutes of and how it  should be 
conducted. In some cases, the ECJ have chosen to conduct  a more limited 
proport ionality test than in other cases. The criterions have varied between one and 
three, and between an alternat ive and cumulat ive formulat ion14, but have been 
considered to be of lit t le pract ical signif icance since the Court usually makes a 
collected assessment and very seldom on the very single criterions.15 
An ex tensive test, however, comprises of three quest ions16: (1) Is the act ion suitable 
or appropriate to achieve the object ive it  pursues? This quest ion pertains to causality 
by which there has to be a connect ion between the means and the ends. (2) Is the 
act ion necessary in order to achieve the object ive? The object ive of the measure 
must not  be capable of being achieved by alternat ive means that are less restrict ive. 
                                              
11
 Bernitz, U. and Kjellgren A. (2002), p. 229. 
12
 Snell, J. (2002), p. 200 and de Burka, G. and Craig, P. (2003), p. 816 and Bernitz, U. (2002), p. 115. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Eriksson, I. O. (2003), p. 587. 
15
 Hettne, J. and Eriksson I. O. (2005), p. 156, and Meyrowitch, A., Allroth, E. and Hettne, J. (2005) p. 56-
57. 
16
 Hettne, J. and Eriksson I. O. (2005) p. 155 and Snell, J. (2002), p. 196, 198 and 200. 
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(3) Is the act ion in reasonable proport ion to the object ive? This quest ion targets the 
Court to conduct a cost- benefit  analysis of the regulat ion by weight ing the nat ional 
interest against the Community interest of free trade. 
2.4 Competit ion Law and State Monopolies 
The provisions of competit ion are applicable to gambling monopolies. Art icle 81 
prohibits limitat ions of  compet it ive measures while art icle 82 prohibits abuse of  
dominant posit ion. Further, art icle 86.1 prohibits Member States from enact ing or 
maintaining any measures in force, contrary to the provisions in the Treaty, in the 
case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States have granted 
special or exclusive rights. The act ivity in quest ion must be of an economic nature 
and any public body carrying on an economic act ivity is considered as an 
undertaking.17 The borderline between economic and non- economic act ivit ies is 
somet imes dif f icult  to draw in the public sector, as act ivit ies, such as health, social 
security and education have a dif fuse status. However, gambling act ivit ies are clearly 
of  an economic nature.18 ECJ has established that a monopoly can be incoherent with 
EC- law19 since it  is not implied that all rights are coherent with EC- law, as art icle 
86.1 depend upon provisions it  is referring to.20 The mere grant of exclusive rights is 
normally not  considered in quarrel with the Treaty, unless it  is constructed in a way 
unable to avoid breaching art icle 86 through the pract ise of the monopoly, for 
example by abusing its dominat ing posit ion.21 Nevertheless, an exception is given, in 
art icle 86.2, to monopoly undertakings running operat ion of services of general 
interest  or to those which have the character of a revenue- producing monopoly, as 
these are considered entrusted with a part icular task important enough to 
safeguard. These are imposed the provisions of  competit ion, but only to an ex tent  
where the provisions do not  rest rain them from complet ing their assigned task. 
Gambling companies are considered as revenue- producing undertakings and it  is 
implied that the undertakings take advantage of their special or exclusive rights to 
provide income to the state.22 However, the development of trade cannot under any 
circumstances be affected contrary to the interest of  the EC. Hence, the main 
quest ion is whether the development of trade is affected through the freedom to 
provide services and the freedom of  establishment, which const itute the 
development of trade. 
2.5 Free Movement of Services 
One of the basic freedoms is declared in art icle 49 -  the f reedom to provide 
services. The art icle states that  “(W)ithin the f ramework of the provisions set out  
below, restrict ions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be 
                                              
17
 Korah, V. (2000), p. 149. 
18
 Faull, J. and Nikpay, A. (1999), p. 279- 280. 
19
 C- 393/ 92, Almelo and C- 320/ 91, Corbeau. 
20
 C- 202/ 88, France/ Commission. 
21
 SOU 2000:50 p. 130. 
22
 Allgård. O. and Norberg S. (2004), p. 292, especially footnote 87. 
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prohibited in respect of nat ionals of  Member States who are established in a State of  
the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended”. 
Not only is any discriminat ion on grounds of nat ionality prohibited, but also any 
restrict ion on, or obstacle to, the f reedom to provide services, even if  they apply 
without dist inct ion to nat ional providers of services and to those established in other 
Member States.23 
Restrict ions are only allowed to be imposed and maintained by Member States, 
provided that no dist inct ions are made on grounds of  nat ionality or residence, if  
they can be just if ied by exemptions provided by EC- law. The prohibit ion is relat ing 
to direct  and indirect discriminat ion of foreign services provided on the concerned 
nat ional markets, but  can also enact to the adoption of non- discriminatory rules to 
foreign services.24 Further, art icle 49 also impedes restrict ions imposed a provider of 
services established in another Member State where he is authorized to provide that  
service.25  
In art icle 50 the def init ion of a service is given. “Services shall be considered to be 
services within the meaning of this Treaty where they are normally provided for 
remunerat ion, insofar as they are not governed by the provisions relat ing to freedom 
of  movement for goods, capital and persons.” This explains why the ECJ always 
inquires if  the quest ion concerns the movement for goods, capital or persons, before 
it  can conclude the act ivity as a service. 
In Schindler26, the Court  concluded lottery act ivit ies to fall within the scope of 
services and not goods.27 This dist inct ion const itutes the second step in the analysis, 
see sect ion 4.1.2 Does the Economic Act ivity Relate to the Free Provision of Services 
or Goods?  
Seeing that services play a larger role in the information economy than goods, it  is 
also a more apt area for the ECJ to uphold nat ional restrict ions. The reasons for this 
are that  nat ional measures can be of  a more variety and the restrict ions are often of  
another nature than strict ly protect ionist, as oppose to the nature of goods.28 In 
pract ise, the free movement have not come as far for services as for goods.29 A total 
of  70 percent  of the Member States’  GNP is comprised by services, but  only 20 
percent const itutes the t rading between them.30  
                                              
23
 C- 42/ 02, Lindman paragraph 20. 
24
 de Burka, G. and Craig, P. (2003), p. 803. See also Case 110/ 78, Van Wesemael; Case 279/ 80, Webb, 
Opinion of Advocate General Slynn; Case C- 154/ 89, Commission/ France, Opinion of Advocate General 
Lenz and Case C- 180/ 89, Commission/ Italy. 
25
 Case C- 76/ 90, Saeger, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, paragraph 12. 
26
 C- 275/ 92, Schindler. 
27
 Ibid, paragraph 25. 
28
 Bernitz, U. and Kjellgren, A. (2002), p. 229- 230. 
29
 Bernitz, U. (2005) p. 25. 
30
 COM(2002)441 f inal. 
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2.6 Freedom of Establishment 
Establishment , which is somet imes referred to as the f if th freedom, is described in 
art icle 43 as the pursuit  of business and free movement for the self- employed. 
“Within the f ramework of  the provisions set out  below, restrict ions on the freedom of  
establishment  of nat ionals of a Member State in the territory of another Member 
State shall be prohibited. Such prohibit ion shall also apply to rest rict ions in the 
sett ing- up of  agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nat ionals of any Member State 
established in the territory of any Member State.” 
This provision gives EC nationals, both natural and legal persons, the right to set  up 
a business in a Member State other than their own. The r ight comprises to set up a 
permanent base if  so is desired whilst  the freedom to provide services is seen as a 
temporary right which does not necessarily involve residence. The dif ference 
between the right  of establishment and the right to provide services is one of degree 
rather than of kind.31 According to Gebhard 32, a person can be established in more 
than one Member State, especially as companies are sett ing up branches or 
subsidiaries, and members of a profession are establishing a second professional 
base.33 
The quest ion of  establishment , in a gambling case, was for the f irst  t ime examined 
in Gambelli (see 2.9.5 Gambelli) since it  had not been adduced in prior case law, 
even though circumstances were at hand (see 2.9.3 Zenat t i). 
2.6.1Except ions 
Exceptions to the f reedom of establishment are stated in the art icles 45 and 46, and 
same exceptions are applicable to the freedom to provide services via art icle 55. 
Art icle 45 attends to act ivit ies exercised by of f icial authority, and has not been 
applicable to any gambling case. Art icle 46 states that “(T)he provisions of this 
Chapter 34 and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the 
applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulat ion or administrat ive act ion 
providing for special treatment for foreign nat ionals on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health”. 
All restrict ive measures, discriminat ing or not, have to be just if ied by the Treaty’ s 
derogations. In addit ion they must be necessary and proport ional to the pursued 
object ive. These requirements are called “rule of  reason” from which the principle of  
overriding reasons of general interest derive. ECJ has concluded that derogations 
aiming at protect ing the recipient of a service such as consumer protect ion and 
                                              
31
 Steiner, J. and Woods, L. (2003) p. 338. 
32
 C- 55/ 94, Gebhard. 
33
 Ibid, p. 339. 
34
 This chapter is referring to the chapter (II) of establishment but  the same provisions are applicable to 
the chapter (III) of services according to art icle 55. 
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public order can just ify restrict ions on the freedom to provide services.35 In the 
Gouda case36, the Court  elaborated the rule of  reason concerning services by stat ing 
that obstacles to the freedom to provide services, arising from national measures 
which are applicable without dist inct ion, are permissible only if  those measures are 
just if ied by overriding reasons relat ing to the public interest , if  they guarantee the 
achievement of  the intended aim and do not  go beyond what is necessary in order to 
achieve it .37 
By virtue of art icle 46, the Treaty provides three exceptions: (1) public policy, (2) 
public security and (3) public health. They shall, according to case law38, be viewed 
holist ically, and therefore it  is quest ionable if  only one fulf il led requirement  is 
enough. Following arguments does not just fall within one exception, but often 
within all three, and they are constant ly being adduced as except ions with a 
changing outcome over the years since the circumstances have varied: Responsible 
gambling policies as it  aim at limit ing the exploitat ion of the human passion for 
gambling. Organised crime as money laundering, tax  evasion and frauds levelled at  
consumers are some of the undesired consequences. The allocat ion of  the prof its to 
public benefit , which const itutes economical motives, was in Schindler, considered 
as pertaining to the public interests in addit ion to the others.39 But in Zenatt i, the ECJ 
expressed it  should merely comprise an incidental benef icial consequence and not  
the real just if icat ion for the restrict ive policy adopted.40 
2.6.2Principle of Overriding Reasons of General Interest  
As art icles 28 and 30 only apply to “goods” and not to “services”, the doctrine of  
Cassis de Dijon, is neither applicable to services nor establishments, see sect ion 2.5 
Free Movement of Services. However, services and establishments have got ten their 
correspondence to the Cassis de Dijon through the Gebhard 41 case.42 The Court  put 
forward four requirements that must be fulf illed by a nat ional measure restrict ing 
the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. The Gebhard test 43, as it  is called, states that 
the restrict ion must: 
1. be applicable in a non- discriminatory manner 
2. be just if ied by reasons of public interest  
                                              
35
 See the joined cases 110/ 78 and 111/ 78 Van Wesemael, paragraph 28; 220/ 83 Commission/ France, 
paragraph 20; and 15/ 78, Koest ler, paragraph 5. Reference was made in Läärä paragraph 33 and Zenatt i 
paragraph 29. 
36
 C- 288/ 89, Gouda. 
37
 Ibid, paragraphs 13- 15. 
38
 C- 275/ 92, Schindler, paragraph 58. However, Advocate General Gulmann could not preclude that  these 
arguments when considered separately, would not  just ify the restr ict ion imposed. Opinion of Advocate 
General Gulmann, paragraph 92. 
39
 C- 275/ 92, Schindler , paragraph 60. 
40
 C- 67/ 98, Zenatt i, paragraph 36. 
41
 C- 55/ 94, Gebhard, see also C- 369/ 96, Arblade, in Läärä paragraph 31 it  is referred to C- 288/ 89, 
Gouda 
42
 Bernitz, U. (2005) p. 208. 
43
 C- 55/ 94, Gebhard , paragraphs 37, 39 and 46 by referring to C- 19/ 92, Krauss, paragraph 32. 
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3. be suitable for the pursuance of the aimed object ive 
4. not  go beyond what is necessary to achieve this object ive 
These four quest ions comprise the three last steps in the analysis. The f irst  quest ion 
in the Gebhard test  const itutes the third step in the analysis, see sect ion 4.1.3 If  
there is a Restrict ion in Place, is it  Discriminat ing?, the second quest ion const itutes 
the fourth step in the analysis, see sect ion 4.1.4 Is the Restrict ion Just if ied?, the 
third and fourth quest ions const itutes a proport ionality test and the f if th step in the 
analysis, see sect ion 4.1.5 Is the Restrict ion Necessary and Proport ionate? 
2.7 Proposal of Service Direct ive 
The European Council init iated an economic process of reform in Lisbon44 striving for 
EU to be the most compet it ive intellectual economy within 2010. The area of services 
was targeted as the most important in this progress, but there are st ill many 
obstacles within the EU. 
In December 2000, the European Commission published a report with the object ive 
to remove all remaining service barriers45. The ult imate aim is to at tend the 
movement of services within a country in the same manner as movements between 
countries within the EU. To facilitate that aim, a two- step approach was set out. A 
f irst  report 46 was to ident ify ex ist ing barriers, and a second report 47 was to bring 
forward a package of init iat ives dismantling the barriers. 
A proposal for a Service Direct ive48, which is to take effect within 2010, endeavours 
the principle of  origin49 in art icle 16 (also known as an internal market clause), but  
according to art icle 18 gambling act ivit ies are excluded from this principle, at least  
temporarily. By virtue of  art icle 40, the Commission shall have one year to inquire 
the possibility to present  a proposal for harmonisat ion regarding gambling act ivit ies. 
The temporary exclusion regarding gambling act ivit ies has its explanation in the 
widely dif ferences between the nat ions’  out looks on how gambling act ivit ies should 
be tackled – to rest rict  it  or tax  it . In the preamble of the proposal it  is clearly stated 
that this Direct ive does not imply an abolit ion of ex ist ing gambling monopolies.50  
In January, 2006, the European Parl iament is expected to vote regarding the 
proposal for Direct ive on services, and especial ly the internal market principle, A 
                                              
44
 Lisbon, European Council, Presidency conclusions (2000). 
45
 Ibid. This proposal had gambling included in the principle of country of or igin whereby it  was rejected 
by Germany (Gerhard Schröder) and France (Jaques Chirac). 
46
 COM(2002)441 f inal. 
47
 COM(2004)2 f inal. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 The principle states that  once a service provider is operat ing legally in one Member State, it  can market 
it s service in another Member State without  having to submit to further rules than of its original Member 
State. For example, a UK- based gambling provider would not have to acquire a Swedish gambling license 
according to this principle. However, this is not  the case since gambling is excluded from the direct ive 
unt il further not ice. 
50
 COM(2004)2, preamble paragraph 35. 
Chapter II – European framework 
 
18 
majority of the Member States seem to support  to exclude gambling, taxes and 
health case.51 
Moreover, a comparat ive study on “Gambling Services in the Internal Market” is being 
conducted by the Commission.52 Subject  of invest igat ion is the effect iveness of the 
nat ional restrict ions in meeting the invoked public interest object ives (public order, 
consumer protect ion, media pluralism, and the protect ion of  cultural policy 
object ives), taking into account the requirements set out in the case law of the ECJ. 
The result  will have an effect on how gambling ought to evolve within the EU – 
taxed, banished or something in between. Therefore, the study is of great  
importance, but it  has been argued that its independence and impart iality is in 
danger.53 
2.8 Direct ive on E- Commerce 
The Direct ive st rives to ensure that Information Society services benefit  f rom the 
internal market principles of  free movement of services and freedom of  
establishment  and to be provided throughout the Union if  they comply with the law 
in their Member State. 
Direct ive 1998/ 34/ EC, amended by Direct ive 98/ 48/ EC, state that an information 
service is a service if 54: (1) normally provided for remunerat ion at a distance, (2) 
conducted by electronic means and (3) executed at  the individual request of  
recipient of services. By this, e- gamble can be considered as a service of the 
information society. Further, the Direct ive on elect ronic commerce55 imposes, as well 
as the Direct ive on services, the internal market  clause expressing the principle of  
country of origin in art icle 3. However, by virtue of art icle 1, the direct ive is not  
applicable to gambling act ivit ies.  
An adoption of a European regulatory framework for e- gaming services seems to be 
appropriate, in view of the de facto borderless nature of e- gaming services and the 
need to regulate the informat ion society from a higher level than that of the Member 
States. An EC f ramework would, part ly establish the ground principles for the cross-
border provision of e- gaming services and harmonize consumer protect ion in the 
f ield of gaming legislat ion, part ly give Member States a certain degree of f lex ibility 
                                              
51
 Dagens Industri, (2005- 11- 29). 
52
 The Commission appointed the Swiss Inst itute of Comparat ive law, which has formed a consort ium with 
the Cent re for the Study of Gambling of the University of Salford to carry out  the economic part  of the 
study. 
53
 According to the European State Lotter ies and Toto Associat ion there are doubts concerning the 
independence and impart iality of the Centre for the Study of Gambling of the University of Salford to 
whom the economic part  is outsourced. Salford are sponsored by a number of Br it ish operators in the 
gambling sector, in part icular an important  Brit ish ‘bookmaker ’  involved in most  of the cases t ried before 
the Italian courts and referred to the European Court  of Just ice, which is endeavouring to radically modify 
the legal framework regulat ing this sphere of act ivity. And it  is alarming since the Centre for the Study of 
Gambling of the University of Salford states on its website that  it s Sponsors’  Advisory Board ‘meets to 
ensure that  the legit imate interests of sponsors are adequately secured’  (Written quest ion E- 2206/ 05). 
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 Direct ive 98/ 34/ EC, art icle 1.2. 
55
 Direct ive 2000/ 31/ EC. 
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to adopt tailored nat ional measures, in compliance with the European framework. 
Therefore, such a framework could be advocated to be in the best interest of all 
part ies concerned.  
2.9 European Case Law on Gambling 
The conflict  between the essence of the EC, in its free movement, and the obstacles 
for these freedoms across borders that follows from a monopoly is constant ly being 
brought before nat ional Courts and the ECJ. In those cases, the public interests are 
being quest ioned and at t rial in order for the European monopolies to sustain. There 
is no explicit  regulat ion within the EC as far as gambling is concerned, but on one 
hand the basic freedoms and competit ion distort ion can and are being adduced, 
mainly by the Commission, and on the other hand, the Member States are adducing 
the public interest and its overriding reasons, in favour of the monopolies. The 
Commission recognizes that nat ional restrict ions can be just if ied by public interest  
object ives, but according to the jurisprudence of  the ECJ, these restrict ions must not  
go beyond what is necessary to attain these aims of public interest.  
However, in one precedential case56, the ECJ withheld that in absence of  any EC 
legislat ion, the Member States has the power to individually assess, based upon their 
social model, what kind of  measures should be imposed to maintain order in society. 
For example, if  one Member State prohibits certain gambling act ivit ies while another 
pract ises a less restrict ive regime, neither does it  necessarily imply that the more 
restrict ive measure is disproport ionate in relat ion to the object ive pursued nor 
unnecessary.  
Later jurisprudence has stressed that a restrict ion could only be allowed if  legal 
disposit ion imposing such a restrict ion de facto corresponded to the evoked 
object ives.57 Therefore, it  could be argued that  a restrict ion must  have a legal 
disposit ion concerning that object ive inserted in the legal instrument, in order for a 
Member State to evoke for example the protect ion of consumers.  
2.9.1Schindler58 
The Schindler verdict from 1992 was the f irst  preliminary ruling concerning 
gambling. The main quest ion of  the case was if  the freedom to provide services 
const ituted an obstacle for a nat ional legislat ion prohibit ing lotteries.  
The background to the case was a mailed invitat ion to Brit ish cit izens from the 
Schindler brothers to take part  in a German lot tery. G. and J. Schindler were agents 
for SKL59 and, therefore, responsible for sending advert isement, ordering forms and, 
if  necessary, lot tery t ickets, on behalf  of SKL. The invitat ions were stopped in the 
Brit ish customs since lot teries of this kind were prohibited according to Brit ish law. 
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 C- 275/ 92, Schindler, paragraph 61; Schindler, opinion of A.G. Gulmann, paragraphs 101- 102. 
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 C- 67/ 98, Zenatt i, paragraph 46. 
58 C- 275/ 92, Schindler. 
59
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Main quest ions were whether lotteries were considered to fall within the scope of the 
free movement of services according to art icle 49 Treaty, and if  that  service could be 
restricted when it  comes to games and lotteries.  
By way of introduct ion, ECJ regarded the act ivity in quest ion to be considered as an 
economic act ivity60, see sect ion 4.1.1 Does the Regulat ion Concerned Relate to an 
Economic Act ivity? If  the act ivity would not have been considered as an economic, 
the Treaty would not be applicable. 
The objects at issue were also to be related to “services”, and not “goods”, even 
though they were physical products61, see sect ion 4.1.2 Does the Economic Act ivity 
Relate to the Free Provision of  Services or Goods?, for further reasoning. According 
to the ECJ, the act ivit ies in quest ion were merely the f irst  step towards the 
organisat ion and conduct ion of a lot tery and therefore they could not be considered 
as independent from the lottery. The Brit ish legislat ion was also considered to 
const itute an obstacle to the freedom to provide services62, even though the nat ional 
measure was applicable without dist inct ion.63 
What  was stated next has in the aftermath become a lodestar for the protect ionist  
argumentat ion of the Member States. ECJ found the restrict ion on the cross- border 
provision of  lot tery services compatible with the Treaty by considering:64 
a) the part icular nature of  lot teries including moral, religious and cultural 
aspects,  
b) the general trend within the Member States to regulate and even forbid 
gambling with the purpose to control private prof its,  
c) the fact that lot teries in many cases increase the risk of dif ferent  kinds of  
criminality, inter alia fraud,  
d) that lotteries give incentive to spend money with possible negative individual 
and social consequences and 
e) although not considered to be an object ive just if icat ion as such, lotteries are 
an important contr ibutor for the f inancing of good causes and public interest  
act ivit ies.  
ECJ concluded the above- mentioned circumstances to just ify the discret ional power 
of  nat ional authorit ies to determine the ex tent of the protect ion afforded by a 
Member State on its terr itory with regard to lotteries and other forms of gambling. 
Thus, when a Member State forbids advert isement on their territory, for big lotteries 
organised in another Member State, it  does not const itute an illegit imate restrict ion 
on the freedom to provide services. On the contrary, such a restrict ion is necessary 
in order to maintain the protect ion set  forth by the Member State on the subject of 
lot teries. 
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Advocate General, A.G. Gulmann, shared the same view in his preliminary ruling by 
reasoning that, in view of  the unknown implicat ions of an open and competit ive 
gaming sector, it  was not possible to ident ify less restrict ive measures for achieving 
the pursued object ives.65 
2.9.2Läärä66 
In Läära, the case in point was whether nat ional legislat ion reserving to a public 
body the right to run the operat ion of  slot machines, on the territory of  the Member 
State concerned, was compatible with the provisions in the Treaty, especially the 
freedom to provide services. 
Läärä, a private person, had been of fering gambling on slot machines, on behalf  of a 
Brit ish company without  a licence. According to Finnish law, only one subject could 
be granted a licence for operat ing games on slot machines and at  the t ime period in 
quest ion, it  had been granted to RAY67. Läärä argued for his cause that  the prospects 
of  winning offered by the slot  machines was not based exclusively on chance but  
also, to a large ex tent, on the skill of  the player. Therefore, those machines could 
not  be regarded as gambling machines, and the Finnish legislat ion was contrary to 
the EC rules governing the free movement of  goods and services.  
The Court considered the slot machines as goods that could fall within art icle 3068, 
but  not in this case, for elaborat ion see sect ion 4.1.2 Does the Economic Act ivity 
Relate to the Free Provision of Services or Goods? It  was, however, stated that such 
legislat ion const ituted an obstacle to the freedom to provide services.69 
The Finnish Court wanted to know if  an analogy could be made with the Schindler 
ruling. Läärä, unhappy with the verdict  in Schindler, argued that the cases dif fered – 
Schindler was about an internat ional lot tery with high prizes, while this regarded an 
entertainment game with small prizes.70 But according to Schindler, the organizat ion 
of  lot teries was to be equally applicable to other comparable forms of gambling 71.72 
ECJ ruled that Finnish law was consistent  with EC- law, considering Schindler, since 
the provision aimed at  the pursued object ive. The aimed object ive was to lim it 
exploitat ion of the human passion for gambling, to avoid the risk of crime and f raud 
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to which the act ivit ies concerned give rise and to authorise those act ivit ies only with 
a view to the collect ion of funds for charity or for other benevolent purposes. The 
Court concluded that there were no disproport ional regulat ions with respect to the 
aimed object ive, or discriminatory for that mat ter. According to Schindler, nat ional 
authorit ies had a discret ional power to determine the ex tent  of the protect ion to be 
afforded by a Member State on its terr itory with regard to lotteries and other forms 
of  gambling. 
The Court considered the Finnish provision fulf ill ing all the requirements necessary 
in order to obtain an exception from the EC freedoms. It  was also pointed out that  
"…given the risk of  crime and fraud…", there were no alternat ives (such as taxat ion) 
to a non- prof it  making approach that  were equally ef fect ive to ensure "…that  strict  
limits are set to the lucrat ive nature of such act ivit ies".73 In addit ion, “…the mere fact 
that a Member State has opted for a system of protect ion which dif fers from that 
adopted by another Member State, cannot affect the assessment of the need for, and 
proport ionality of, the provisions enacted to that end. Those provisions must be 
assessed solely by reference to the object ives pursued by the nat ional authorit ies of  
the Member State concerned and the level of protect ion which they are intended to 
provide.74  
Contrary to the quoted opinions and decisions, it  was Advocate General La Pergola’ s 
opinion that the Finish law, grant ing RAY the right to run gambling machines, did 
not  meet  the criterion of  proport ionality. However, the ECJ saw it  dif ferent ly and did 
not  follow this opinion.75 
2.9.3Zenatt i76 
In 1998, the main quest ion was whether a nat ional provision restrict ing the taking of  
bets could const itute an obstacle to the freedom to provide services according to the 
Treaty. 
Zenatt i ran a centre for the exchange of information on sport bets and acted as an 
intermediary in Italy for a Brit ish company (SSP77) specialising in taking bets. In Italy, 
bett ing where only permitted on events organized by the nat ional Olympic 
Committee, CONI78 (sports events) and the nat ional equine organizat ion, UNIRE79 
(horse races). Other subjects could submit invitat ions to tender for licenses to 
organize bets, in return for, payment of the relevant levies, and being subject to 
comply with ministerial guidelines regarding the proper management of bett ing 
act ivity. 
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Zenatt i argued that  Schindler was not applicable since this case dealt  with 
competence and skilfulness in predict ing the outcomes. By referring to skilfulness, 
bett ing could be interpreted as a contest rather than gambling. According to Zenat t i, 
the just if icat ions in terms of  social considerat ions and prevent ion of fraud should 
not  be considered as enough to restrict  the free movement of services. The Italian 
Court on the other hand advocated for an analogy with Schindler before referring to 
the ECJ.  
ECJ did observe two discrepancies between the cases. First ly, in Schindler, Great  
Britain had a total ban against large- scaled lotteries, while in this case, there was no 
total ban. Instead, the government let certain selected organizat ions to run gambling 
with special regulat ions. The Court st ressed that the mere fact  that one Member 
State prohibits certain gaming act ivit ies, while another Member State advocates a 
less restrict ive regime, for example, by grant ing a limited number of licenses, does 
not  necessarily imply that the more restrict ive measure is disproport ionate in 
relat ion to the object ive pursued, or unnecessary.80 Secondly, in the case set forth, 
the freedom of establishment could apply since SSP possessed the right to run 
gambling business in another Member State and aimed at the same freedom in Italy. 
Notably, the Italian Court did not raise both quest ions before the ECJ. Hence, the ECJ 
only considered the quest ion regarding the movement of services, since it  was 
prevented from examining the case on the basis of establishment.81  
The ECJ concluded that, according to previous case law, the freedom to provide 
services may be restricted by Italian law, if  it  could be motivated by social 
considerat ions and aimed to prevent the harmful effect  that could be caused by 
gambling. 
Advocate General Fennelly was of the opinion that it  was for the nat ional Court to 
consider whether the two condit ions, necessary and proport ionate, were met. 
Further, Fennelly condemned a Member State to engage either direct ly or through 
certain privi leged bodies in the act ive promotion of off icially organized gambling 
with the primary object ive of f inancing social act ivit ies, however worthy, under the 
guise of a morally just if ied policy to control gambling.82 
2.9.4Anomar83 
The quest ion concerned Portuguese legislat ion relat ing to the operat ion and playing 
of  games of chance or gambling under decree- law and whether it  complied with EC-
law. The quest ions were raised by Anomar 84 (the Portuguese nat ional associat ion of 
operators in the gambling machine sector) against the Portuguese state.  
The Portuguese decree provided that  the right to operate games of  chance or 
gambling was reserved to the state. Although the state alone is ent it led to that  right, 
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it  could be exercised, other than by the state or another public body, subject to 
authorizat ion in the form of an administrat ive licensing agreement. 
The decree- law was acknowledged by the Court to be applicable without dist inct ion 
to its own nat ionals and nat ionals of other Member States, and const itute a barrier 
to the f reedom to provide services. Nonetheless, such a law was considered just if ied 
in view of the concerns of social policy and the prevention of fraud. 85 
By referring to Läärä86 and Zenatt i87, ECJ stressed that that the possible ex istence, in 
other Member States, of legislat ion laying down condit ions for the operat ion and 
playing of games of chance or gambling which are less restrict ive than those 
provided for by the Portuguese legislat ion has no bearing on the compatibility with 
EC- law.88 Therefore, the choice of methods for organising and controlling the 
operat ion and playing of games of chance or gambling, falls within the margin of  
discret ion which the nat ional authorit ies enjoy.89 
2.9.5Gambelli90 
In the Gambelli case the quest ion raised was if  a nat ional legislat ion, which prohibits 
on pain of  criminal penalt ies the pursuit  of the act ivit ies of collect ing, taking, 
booking and forwarding offers of bets, in part icular bets on sport ing events, without  
a licence or authorizat ion from the Member State concerned, const itutes a restrict ion 
on the f reedom of establishment  and the freedom to provide services provided for in 
art icles 43 and 49 of the Treaty respect ively. 
Gambelli was an Italian agency, one among many, that belonged to the English 
bookmaker Stanley91. The agencies were accused of having collaborated in Italy with 
a bookmaker abroad in the act ivity of collect ing bets which is normally reserved by 
law to the state, thus infringing Italian law. Such act ivity was considered to be 
incompatible with the monopoly on sport ing bets, and was solely enjoyed by CONI92. 
The case before the Italian Court 93, 94 did not quite correspond to the facts already 
considered by the ECJ in Zenatt i. Recent amendments to an Italian provision 
demanded a re- examination of the issue by the ECJ. It  became known that the 
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restrict ions were dictated chief ly by the need to protect sports Totoricevitori, a 
category of private sector undertakings. Not only that, no public policy concerns 
were found by the Court  in those restrict ions able to just ify a limitat ion of the rights 
guaranteed by the EC or const itut ional rules.95 
Further, the nat ional Court quest ioned whether the principle of  proport ionality was 
being observed, having regard, f irst  to the severity of the prohibit ion imposed with 
criminal penalt ies which may have made it  impossible in pract ice for lawfully 
const ituted undertakings or EC operators to carry on economic act ivit ies in the 
bett ing and gaming sector in Italy, and secondly to the importance of the nat ional 
public interest protected and for which the EC freedoms were sacrif iced. 
Foremost, the Italian Court also considered that  it  could not ignore the ex tent  of the 
apparent  discrepancy between nat ional legislat ion severely rest rict ing the 
acceptance of bets on sport ing events by foreign EC undertakings on one hand, and 
the considerable expansion of bett ing and gaming which the Italian state was 
pursuing at nat ional level for the purpose of collect ing taxat ion revenues, on the 
other. 
In Gambelli, both the freedom to provide services and the freedom of 
establishment 96 were addressed. ECJ came with a ground breaking verdict , at least 
according to many ant i- monopolists. It  stated that  the Italian Act  was an obstacle to 
the f reedom of establishment 97 and to the freedom to provide services.98 Gambelli 
argued that  it  was remarkably that  bettors in Italy were not only deprived of the 
possibility of using bookmakers established in another Member State, even through 
the intermediary of operators established in Italy, but by doing so they were also 
subject to criminal penalt ies. The Court  agreed that the prohibit ion in quest ion, 
enforced by criminal penalt ies, was a restrict ion on the freedom to provide services.  
The sensational statement was the Court ’ s not ion that authorit ies of a Member State 
cannot invoke public order concerns relat ing to the need to reduce opportunit ies for 
bett ing in order to just ify measures if  they incite and encourage consumers to 
part icipate in lotteries, games of chance and bett ing to the f inancial benefit  of the 
public purse.99 Under present case, the state owned gambling company had been 
market ing their games aggressively in addit ion to a planned increase in amount  of  
games. By these means, the purpose of  the policies pursued could not have been to 
limit  gambling, and therefore they did not have any right to limit  the free movement  
of  services.  
Regarding the exceptions100, the Court referred to paragraph 36 of the judgment in 
Zenatt i, concluding that  restrict ions must in any event ref lect a concern to bring 
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about  a genuine diminut ion of gambling opportunit ies, and the f inancing of  social 
act ivit ies through a levy on the proceeds of authorized games must only const itute 
an incidental beneficial consequence and not the real just if icat ion for the restrict ive 
policy adopted. However, the Court concluded that it  is for the nat ional Court to 
determine: 
1. Whether the restrict ion on the freedom of establishment  and on the freedom 
to provide services could be just if ied by imperat ive requirements in the 
general interest, be suitable for achieving the object ive which they pursue 
and not go beyond what  is necessary in order to attain it . In any event, they 
must  be applied without discriminat ion.101 
2. Whether it  in pract ice were more easily for Italian operators than for foreign 
operators to, regarding the manner in which the condit ions were laid down, 
submit invitat ions to tender for licences to organise bets on sport ing events. 
If  so, those condit ions do not sat isfy the requirement of non-
discriminat ion.102 
3. Whether the imposed restrict ions were restrict ions beyond what is necessary. 
Especially as in this case “…where the supplier of the service was subject in 
his Member State of establishment to a regulat ion entailing controls and 
penalt ies103, where the intermediaries were lawfully const ituted” and where 
”…before the statutory amendments effected by the Italian Act  in quest ion, 
those intermediaries considered that they were permitted to transmit  bets on 
foreign sport ing events”.104 
4. Finally, whether the aims which might just ify the nat ional legislat ion are 
actually served, and in the light of  those aims, whether the restrict ions it  
imposed were disproport ionate.105 
As I will analyse in chapter IV, the delegations made by the ECJ to the nat ional Court, 
has been advocated by either side. The fact that  each quest ion was given guidelines 
to the nat ional Court to consider, is undisputed. The dif ference of  opinion is 
composed of how strict  the guidelines could be interpreted and therefore how much 
discret ionary scope the ECJ actually had left  to the nat ional Court.  
2.9.6Opinion of Advocate General Siegbert  Alber 
I would like to give some considerat ion to Advocate General Siegbert Alber’ s 
opinion, since he kind of paved the way for the crit icism in Gambelli. One should 
remember that the ECJ has more polit ical considerat ions to embrace than the 
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Advocate General, sharing a mere opinion, and often so in the spirit  of de lege 
ferenda. 
Alber did go further in his analysis of the case by not delegat ing the quest ions to the 
nat ional Court  to determine. The quest ions did not lie within the discret ional power 
of  the Member State to determine, according to Alber.  
Given the circumstances in the case, Alber did not consider Italy to pract ise a 
consistent policy in order to limit  the supply of gambling, part ly due to aggressive 
market ing, which was aimed to incite and encourage, part ly due to the fact that 
legislat ion had opened up the possibility to offer an increased amount of supply of 
gambling. The claimed object ives, once stated, but no longer pursued, could no 
longer just ify obstacles to the freedoms set forth in the Treaty.106 
Alber also st ressed that it  had become evident f rom the Member States’  statements 
that they were afraid of the economic consequences a change in the gambling 
market could bring about .107 
In conclusion, when as in this case, the object ive required for a just if icat ion can be 
quest ioned due to inconsistent polit ics and no overriding reasons of  general interest  
is at hand, it  can only be disproport ional with a pain of criminal penalt ies. 
2.9.7Lindman108 
In Lindman, the quest ion brought before ECJ was where a gambling winning should 
be taxed. The ECJ had to determine whether a nat ional legislat ion, imposing tax  on 
lotteries won abroad, was compatible with the f reedoms within the Treaty; both to 
provide and receive services. 
The Finnish woman Lindman had during a stay in Sweden bought a lot tery t icket  on 
which she later won SEK one million. The Finnish government wanted Lindman to 
pay income tax  on the winning, even if  all prizes in Finnish lot teries were exempted 
from tax  for the buyer of  the t icket since the organiser of the lot tery was submitted 
to pay a lottery tax. The same rules apply in Sweden.  
Lindman argued that  the Finnish legislat ion was discriminat ing since she would not  
have been imposed to any income tax  if  she had lived in Sweden or if  she had won in 
a Finnish lottery. 
The Finnish Government admit ted that the nat ional legislat ion could be 
discriminatory, but that it  should be just if ied by reasons of public interest such as 
the prevent ion of wrongdoing and fraud, the reduct ion of social damage caused by 
gambling, the f inancing of act ivit ies in the public interest and ensuring legal 
certainty.  
According to case law109, the reasons which may be invoked by a Member State by 
way of  just if icat ion must be accompanied by an analysis of appropriateness and 
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proport ionality of the restrict ive measure adopted by that  state.110 Further, the ECJ 
stated that it  lacked evidence from the referring Court, in order to conclude a 
part icular causal relat ionship between the gravity of the risks connected to playing 
games of chance and the part icipat ion by nat ionals of the Member State concerned 
in lotteries organized in other Member States.111 
For that  reason, ECJ concluded that art icle 49 of  the Treaty prohibits winnings from 
games of chance, organised in other Member States, being imposed income tax , as 
winnings from games of chance conducted in the Member State in quest ion are not  
taxable.  
Thus, in l ine with the European integrat ion, even the area of taxat ion is becoming 
harmonized, and countries members of the EU and EFTA are now forced to change 
their tax  legislat ion in accordance with the ruling. 
2.10 Aftermath of Gambelli 
Gambelli has been interpreted both in favour of , and against, a gambling monopoly, 
and will  later be elaborated in chapter IV. This sect ion aims to out l ine part ly, the 
dif ferent verdicts of the nat ional Courts post the Gambelli case part ly, show act ions 
taken against countries submit ted to the provisions in quest ion. The fact  that it  has 
been interpreted dif ferent ly by the Courts, indicates the uncertainty from Gambelli, 
and that is the only thing for sure that Gambelli has rendered. Following has 
happened since Gambelli , in chronological order: 
November 2003, German Court rules in favour of Westdeutsche Lotterie GmbH u. 
Co. oHG and Ladbrokes was forced to close down its German language Internet  
sites.112 
However, in February 2004, the Hessischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Administrat ive 
Court of Appeal of Hessen) states that Art icle 284 of the German Criminal Code is 
not  applicable to the offering of bets to German consumers, by foreign bookmakers, 
whether from within Germany or online. Penalising foreign bookmakers would 
const itute a blatant breach of Art icle 49 in the light of the ex tensive market ing made 
by Oddset to raise funds for the 2006 World Cup.113 
February 2004, subsequently, the Administrat ive Court of  Kassel declared the 
current state of licensing provisions on gambling as unconst itut ional. Art icle 12 of  
the German Const itut ion concerns the freedom to choose one’ s profession and the 
state's exclusive right to operate sports bett ing was considered incompatible with 
it .114 
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March 2004, the Commission sends a warning (letter of formal not ice) to Denmark 
imposing it  to just ify its restrict ions on non- Danish bookmakers, or else it  will be 
brought before the ECJ.115 
April 2004, German Constitut ional Court , Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), declares it  would 
be unjust if ied to impose an Austrian licensed bookmaker an obligat ion to obtain an 
addit ional German license. It  referred to a decision of the Landgericht  München I of  
27 October 2003, in which the Court concluded the gambling monopoly of 
organizat ion of sports bets and lotteries to be adopted and maintained by tax  
reasons and not of public order. A German Gambelli case is to be expected before 
the ECJ.116  
May 2004, the Finnish government  rejects licence applicat ions from European Sports 
Bett ing Consultants and Ladbrokes on the grounds that licences granted to Oy 
Veikkaus AB and Fintoto Oy are st ill in force.117 
May 2004, the most important Italian judiciary body competent in interpret ing 
ordinary laws (the United Sect ions of the Italian Court of Cassation) conf irms the 
legality of the Italian state’ s monopoly.118 The opinion of the Court is that the 
purpose is to “canalize” the demand into more checkable systems in order to combat 
criminality.119  
June 2004, an interlocutory judgement is given by the Court of Arnhem, in which 
explicit  reference was made to Gambelli and in which it  was held that rest rict ions 
imposed to prevent  Ladbrokes entering the Dutch market were inconsistent  with 
European Law. The outcome was in respect  of the market ing budget  (  25 millions) 
of  De Lot to organizat ion and Holland Casino, and the very deliberate attempts to 
st imulate demand for new gambling products. It  can be argued in consistency with 
Gambelli, as no public order in order to just ify restrict ive measures could be 
adduced, where part icipat ion in lotteries, games of chance and bett ing were 
encouraged by the Member State with the aim to accrue the public purse.120 
In July 2004, the Italian Supreme Court rules in favour of Italy's restrict ive gambling 
polit ic. As the restrict ions were just if ied by public order interest (keeping gambling 
free from criminality), it  did not const itute a restrict ion on the freedom of  
establishment  and the freedom to provide services provided for in Art icles 43 and 49 
of  the Treaty respect ively. Notably, the Larino Dist rict  Court  subsequent ly referred 
the case (Placanica121) to the ECJ. Its judgment is st ill pending. 
October 2004, the Commission refers Greece to the ECJ for infringing Union 
regulat ions on the free movement of goods and services, since Greek Law Number 
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3037 explicit ly forbids electronic games with "elect ronic mechanisms and software" 
from public and private places, with offenders facing f ines of 5,000 to 75,000 euros 
and imprisonment of  one to twelve months.122 
Later in October, the Swedish Supreme Administrat ive Court delivers a ruling in 
favour of the state’ s gambling monopoly. This is followed by Douglas Roos (CEO of 
Ladbrokes) accusing the Court  of "running polit ical errands".123 
November 2004, legal proceedings are init iated against online bookmaker 
Sport ingbet, by Hungary's Gambling Supervision, on grounds of contravening the 
gambling legislat ion. A f ine has already been imposed Provimar Kft , Sport ingbet's 
Hungarian media buyer Ft 500,000 and asked the company to remove Hungarian-
language content from the Sport ingbet website.124 
Same month, a Court of  appeal upheld the decision of Oslo's Municipal Court that  
the planned state monopoly on gambling machines violates the European Economic 
Area (EEA) Agreement regulat ions125. Prior to this, a letter of  formal not ice was sent 
by the EFTA Surveillance Authority in April same year, in which a monopoly was not 
considered to be the answer in the prevention of gambling addict ion or under- age 
gambling, to control software, to introduce new regulat ions more quickly, or to 
combat crime. In the end it  stated that same effects could be achieved by the 
imposit ion of stricter rules on private operators.126 
February 2005, the Dutch Supreme Court upholds a ruling implying that Ladbrokes, 
as it  does not  have a Dutch bet t ing licence cannot  accept  bets from customers based 
in Holland.127  
May 2005, a recent government  decision preventing Ladbrokes from operat ing in 
Finland is overturned by the Finnish Supreme Administrat ive Court.128 
June 2005, as oppose to previous ruling, the Swedish Supreme Administrat ive Court  
decides not to overturn the Swedish government's decision129 to reject an applicat ion 
from Ladbrokes to be allowed to set up bet t ing operat ions in Sweden.130  
July 2005, le tribunal de grande instance de Paris ruled that Zeturf  Ltd should stop 
accepting bets on French horse racing.131 
August 2005, the Norwegian Court  of Appeal overturns an earl ier ruling by the Oslo 
Town Court, concluding that  the grant ing of a monopoly on gambling machines to 
Norsk Tipping does not violate European Economic Area (EEA) rules on free 
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movement of services and freedom of establishment. The Court found the grant ing 
of  a monopoly proport ionate to the policy aiming to decrease the supply of bett ing 
and cited Läärä.132 
August 2005, a Dutch Court rules in favour of online gambling restrict ions and 
orders the UK based bookmaker Ladbrokes to stop of fering online services to Dutch 
cit izens. A  penalty per day for non compliance is imposed by the Court.133  
September 2005, an at tended and ant icipated decision is being delayed to early 
2006.134 The German Federal Const itut ional Court is to regard the provision of 
bett ing services by private companies. According to Wulf  Hambach, the Court has 
delayed its decision, in response to huge public pressure; he nonetheless concludes, 
that the fact that the Court has asked for an oral hearing, may strongly indicate a 
preference in favour of liberalising the German bett ing market.135 
November, 2005, the Swedish Supreme Court refers a case to the ECJ, regarding 
Unibet ’ s interlocutory legal protect ion concerning the polemic of the freedom to 
provide services and Swedish provisions. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Swedish Framework 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Background  
In Sweden, the gambling and lot tery markets are regulated whereby only certain 
actors are allowed, these actors being public benefit  organizat ions, the horse racing 
industry and the Swedish state136, see Appendix  1, chart 1. 
Within gambling and lot tery, from the Member States’  point  of view137, there is an 
est imated high risk for unscrupulous arrangers to exploit  a lot tery, for example, for 
criminal purposes such as fraud or usury. Furthermore, lotteries and gambling 
involve risks of social and economic considerat ions for consumers. Hence, lotteries 
have for many years been subject to state regulat ion in Sweden, as well as in other 
parts of  the world. 
However, the Swedish state has a double funct ion since it , part ly conducts the 
commercial operat ion of gambling (through Svenska Spel and ATG), part ly carries 
out  supervision (through The Swedish gambling board -  Lotteriinspekt ionen). Both 
operat ions are submitted to the Department of Finance. The double funct ion of the 
state is often referred to as leading to a situat ion of conf lict . On one hand, gambling 
must be suppressed by the legislator, but on the other hand gambling must be sold 
as a product. 
3.2 The Swedish Monopoly 
Last  year (2004), the Swedish gambling market amounted to approx imately SEK 36,5 
billion, see Appendix  A, table 1. The subjects allowed to conduct gambling and 
lottery act ivit ies in Sweden are Svenska Spel AB, AB Trav och Galopp (ATG) and 
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public benefit  organizat ions. Svenska Spel is a company wholly owned by the 
Swedish state which arose through a fusion between Tipst jänst  AB and 
Penninglotteriet AB, in January 1997. The fusion was made to st rengthen the 
companies due to increased demand of gambling and increased competit ion.138 The 
operat ions of Svenska Spel include bett ings at sport ing events and dog races, the 
operat ion of gambling machines and the organizat ion of  lot teries. ATG is owned by 
the horse racing industry and operates bett ings at horse races. "Public benefit  
organizat ions" is a collect ive term that covers voluntary organizat ions that carry out  
work for the public benefit . The public benefit  organizat ions organize lotteries and 
bingo. All Swedish operators were granted permission a, in 2002, to use new 
technologies, such as the Internet, for the distribut ion of  lot teries. 
3.3 National Legislat ion 
Two Acts of parliament governs lotteries in Sweden: The Lot tery Act and The Casino 
Act. The Lottery Act establishes general regulat ion of all lot tery act ivit ies in Sweden. 
The Casino Act regulates casinos operat ing by internat ional rules of gambling. The 
government has granted Svenska Spel a permit to arrange casino gambling, and the 
f irst  opened in June 2001. To this date, December 2005, there are four casinos in 
the cit ies of Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö and Sundsvall respect ively. A third Act of 
interest is the Public Procurement Act . However, in its § 2, services supplied by 
undertakings entrusted exclusive rights, according to Swedish provisions and in 
accordance with EC- law, shall be excluded from the Act. Consequently, as in sect ion 
2.4 Compet it ion Law, it  all comes down to whether the Swedish provisions are 
incoherent  with EC- law. For purpose of this paper, emphasis is therefore put  on the 
Lottery Act. 
3.3.1Lot tery Act 
The Lottery Act is foremost  to be applicable on lot teries organised for the public. By 
virtue of § 3, a lottery is def ined as ”an act ivity where one or more part icipants may, 
with or without a stake, obtain prizes of a higher value than that which each and 
every one of the other part icipants may obtain”.  
Main principle in § 9 states that  lotteries are only to be organised after an obtained 
permit , which according to § 10, only can be obtained if  the operat ions can be 
assumed to be conducted in an appropriate manner from a general point of view and 
in accordance with direct ions, condit ions and regulat ions issued. 
As stated in § 15, the permit can further only be granted to Swedish legal ent it ies 
that are non- prof it  associat ions that, according to its const itut ion, have the 
promotion of objects that  are of public benefit  within the country and that conducts 
act ivit ies that principally sat isfy such object ive. 
According to § 27, only state owned gambling companies can obtain a permit to 
arrange gambling on token machines, that is, only Swedish undertakings. 
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In § 38, there is a prohibit ion on promotion of part icipat ion in unlawful lot teries 
arranged within the country or in lotteries outside the country. Note that lotteries 
outside the country do not  have to be unlawful, they are per def init ion excluded. 
This means that only Swedish lot teries are to be promoted in Sweden. The 
preparatory work advocates the prohibit ion on promotion of part icipat ion to be 
necessary, as the prohibit ion of organising lotteries without permission otherwise 
would be point less, in order for the current  state to sustain.139 Moreover, as the 
prohibit ion in § 15 could be just if ied by overriding reasons, § 27 was viewed in the 
same manner, hence, no amendments was therefore suggested in the preparatory 
work. 
In accordance to § 45, the government has granted requests from ATG, Svenska Spel 
and A- Lot terierna to organise gambling over the Internet. The paragraph offers the 
possibility to grant special lot tery permits in other cases and according to other 
procedures than otherwise provided by the Lottery Act. 
The supervisory body is Lotteriinspekt ionen (the Gambling Board), and its dut ies 
include the supervision of the Swedish gambling market, based on the protect ive 
aims specif ied in the Lottery Act. Permits for lot teries are granted at  the level of a 
municipality, a region or across the whole country. Other permits are granted by 
municipalit ies, county councils, the Gambling Board, or by the government . 
By virtue of § 45, it  is a criminal offence to organise a lottery in Sweden without a 
permit , but part icipat ion is excluded from the criminal of fence. It  is also forbidden 
to promote part icipat ion in lotteries arranged outside the country. Violat ions may 
result  in f ines or imprisonment.  
3.4 Swedish Gambling Monopoly under Scrut iny 
The Commission has received several complaints regarding the Swedish legislat ion 
concerning slot machines and the monopoly in general, whereby a formal not ice was 
submitted to the Swedish government. The not ice expressed standpoints regarding 
the purpose of the Swedish legislat ion and its compatibility with EC- law.140 The 
Commission considers the Swedish gambling monopoly to mainly have an economic 
purpose.141  
The reply142, given in the end of 2004, advocated prof it  max imizat ion as 
subordinated to public interest. Notably, the not ice mainly refers to slot  machines; 
inter alia the Jack Vegas-  and Miss Vegas- machines and the public procurement  of  
them. Thus, the ent ire gambling legislat ion was not at scrut iny.  
Subsequent ly, all marketing regarding the Jack Vegas and Miss Vegas ended in 2001 
since it  const ituted one of the most addict ive forms of gambling according to 
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Folkhäsoinst itutet 143. Svenska Spel has on the other hand, made large market ing 
investments regarding their other products. In 2003 over SEK 800 million were spent 
on advert ising by the state owned gambling companies and even more has been 
spent  since then.144 The Swedish government  has explained the aggressive market ing 
as necessary in order to compete with foreign gambling companies.145 Since the 
nature of gambling has become border- less, the fact that there ex ists a gambling 
monopoly has been erased. 
3.5 Swedish Case Law on Gambling 
There are not many cases brought before the nat ional Courts that  touch the 
quest ion of applicability of EC- law on nat ional provisions. Most of the cases concern 
the advert isement of a gambling company. A few cases have been brought  before 
the Courts of Appeal, and none have been referred to the ECJ, unt il recently. 
However, three cases, presented below, were recently brought before the Swedish 
Supreme Administrat ive Court  and they all faced the same outcome. Case 5819- 01 
is very elucidat ive whilst  case 7919- 01 only refers to the f irst  one as it  was f irst  
announced that  day. The last case has been referred to the ECJ by the Swedish 
Supreme Court, thus, it  is pending. 
3.5.1Case 5819- 01 
The case concerned an arrangement of  gambling offered by SSP Overseas Bett ing 
Limited (SSP) in which Wermdö Krog AB was the intermediary. Wermdö had 
previously been submitted a f ine by the Swedish Gambling board. The quest ion was 
if  § 38 of the Swedish Lot tery Act, the prohibit ion of promoting part icipat ion in 
foreign lotteries, was compatible with the Treaty. 
It  was mainly a quest ion of whether nat ional provisions were discriminat ing foreign 
companies as they, f rom a general point  of view, were excluded from the operat ion 
of  gambling and lottery. 
Adduced arguments by SSP and underlying causes were the following: 
• The pract ical effect  of the Swedish provisions does not correspond to the 
claimed underlying object ives. It  is irrelevant if  the object ive is in line with EC-
law, if it  is not pract ised. 
• Svenska Spel and ATG are invest ing an est imat ion of SEK 800 millions each 
year in market ing.146 If  the state really safeguards consumers against gambling 
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addict ion, then it  should be addressed in the same way as alcohol and tobacco, 
and advert isement should be prohibited for all operators.  
• As a result  of the aforement ioned, Sweden has more addictions among youths 
than other European countries. It  enhances the image of the Swedish state of 
not giving priority to consumer interest but to benefit  the public purse. 
• ATG has obtained a permit to promote part icipat ion in lotteries organised 
abroad . The permission is condit ioned with all ied foreign organizat ions to 
receive equivalent permissions. Therefore, it  appears as the Swedish 
government only permits foreign companies as long as foreign consumers 
could be assumed to cover the domestic loss derived from playing abroad. 
• Overall, the Swedish state is represent ing a polit ic that contr ibutes to an 
increased number of gambling products with the object ive to benefit  the public 
purse, whereby no overriding reasons can be applicable. 
The Court  followed the Swedish state’ s arguments and asserted that Gambelli did 
not  affect the Swedish case law as adduced by SSP. Gambelli has to be viewed in the 
light  of  the Italian framework, part ly as the legislat ive change was made to protect  
certain private operators as others were prohibited to cont inue, part ly due to Italian 
policy conducted whereas a substant ial increase was made in the number of games 
of fered. 
The most central quest ion, acknowledged by the Court, was whether the object ives 
were real. Put more concrete, whether restrict ive policy pract ised by the Member 
State is a quest ion of public interest, and therefore embraced by overriding reasons, 
or a quest ion of protect ing a monopoly from foreign competitors in order to benefit  
the public purse. SSP has part icularly adduced extensive market ing, cont inuous 
introduct ion of new products and the fact that gambling is increasing constant ly. 
The Court did conclude that  the market ing was ex tensive and intensive, and 
therefore, consumers were “incited and encouraged to part icipate in lotteries, games 
of  chance and bet t ing”147. However, in order for the Swedish measures to be 
incompatible with EC- law, the act ions must  be “to the f inancial benefit  of the public 
purse”148. Albeit , it  would be naive to think that  the economical contribut ion plays a 
minor importance, however, it  could not be taken for granted that it  was the only or 
completely dominating object ive.149 
Further the Court stated the criteria of proport ionality to play a less prominent role 
in perspect ive of EC- law than adduced by SSP. When several alternat ives are at hand, 
it  lies within the discret ionary assessment of  the Member State to choose which 
alternat ive, as long as it  is not disproport ionate considering the aimed object ive 
(Läärä paragraph 39 and Gambelli paragraph 75).150 Considering the circumstances, 
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the legislator could not  be invoked to, with regards to a proport ionality test, choose 
a less restrict ive model. 
By referring to Läärä paragraph 37 and Zenatt i paragraph 35, the Court  emphasized 
that even though games in issue were not total ly prohibited it  could not serve as 
evidence of that the nat ional legislat ion was not  in reality intended to achieve the 
object ives of public interest. And by the vast amount  of money involved, risk of  
attract ing criminality and fraud was considered as evidently high. 
As far as the prohibit ion in § 38 is concerned, the Court acknowledged the 
unfortunate wording. Thus, it  clarif ied that according to preparatory work 151, no 
discriminat ion was intended since the measure is applicable on both Swedish and 
foreign lotteries for which a permit  had not been obtained. 
As the ECJ delegated discret ionary assessment to the nat ional Courts which 
comprised an obligat ion to, from t ime to t ime, examine if  pract ical applicat ion was 
in accordance with EC- law, the Court acknowledged the outcome to may vary over 
t ime. The Court therefore remarked the government adoption of a direct ive152 as this 
will result  in a proposal for legislat ive adaptat ion to the development of EC- law, and 
in part icular to recent case law. 
3.5.2Case 7119- 01 
In this case the quest ion was whether the prohibit ion of  promot ing part icipat ion in 
foreign lotteries could be applicable to the circumstances and if  the provisions were 
applicable to EC- law. 
A banner had been placed on a website by person A.B. whereby visitors were 
directed to SSP’ s website. A.B. had received reimbursement  for this act ion which lead 
the Court to assent previous verdicts by lower Courts and the gambling board, by 
which the Swedish provisions were found to be in accordance with EC- law. 
3.5.3Case 3841- 04 
Ladbrokes had been refused an applicat ion, by the Swedish government, to organize 
gambling. The quest ion was whether the government had refused the applicat ion 
correct ly, in accordance with EC- law. 
Ladbrokes wanted to obtain a permit from the Swedish government to organize 
gambling, but  was refused on grounds that  surplus shall accrue to public interest. 
According to Gambelli, the raising of money for good causes cannot in i tself  just ify a 
restrict ive policy, whereby Ladbrokes quest ioned the reason for the reject ion. 
The Swedish Supreme Administrat ive Court did acknowledge the unlucky wording of 
the refusal in its deceptiveness and imperfect ion. The decision can therefore be 
considered as incorrect . However, the outcome in the decision is not contrary to the 
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Lottery Act or EC- law according to hitherto case law. Thus, the government ’ s 
decision should not be reversed based upon the inadequate explanatory statement.  
3.5.4Case Ö 4474- 04 
Unibet has quest ioned the prohibit ion of  promotion of part icipat ion and sued the 
Swedish state for loss of income due to the maintaining of the prohibit ion. For the 
f irst  t ime, the Swedish Supreme Court has referred a gambling case to the ECJ. 
In March 2003, Unibet was given a leave to appeal153 in the Swedish Supreme Court 
regarding the quest ion to plead the cause of conf irmation whether certain Swedish 
provisions concerning lotteries are incoherent with the freedom to provide services 
according to art icle 49 of  the Treaty, especially the market ing. The Swedish Court  of  
Appeal had previously dismissed the claim on the plea, based on that a cause of  
conf irmation could not  be considered permitted by EC- law.154 However, the Swedish 
Supreme Court has referred the case to the ECJ in clearance of the following 
quest ions: 
1. part ly, if  EC- law const itutes a right  for the companies to a real t rial of their 
claims regarding interlocutory legal protect ion by the proclamation of non-
applicability of Swedish provisions, 
2. part ly, if  EC- law, therefore regarding these interlocutory claims, implies an 
assessment according to nat ional interlocutory provisions or criterions 
provided by EC- law, 
3. and part ly, if , so, which are these EC- criterions. 
3.6 Predicaments of the Swedish Gambling Monopoly – 
Gambling Companies v. the State 
In the following sect ion, the arguments regarding the Swedish gambling monopoly 
are divided in three categories: market act ivit ies, new products and legislat ive 
measures. Each category will be elucidated from both sides. All arguments adduced 
by the gambling companies will be followed by those of the Swedish state. 
3.6.1Market Act ivit ies 
A f irst  group of arguments concern market act ivit ies and are based on state incomes 
and its drast ic increase as a result  f rom aggressive market ing. More than SEK 900 
millions was spent  last year (2004).155 ATG and Svenska Spel are market ing 
themselves in several media by f inancing Channel 75 and the show “Spelbolaget” in 
Channel TV4+ , main sponsoring the two highest divisions in Swedish football, ice 
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hockey and the Swedish nat ional handball team. Overall it  has been concluded that  
the market ing efforts made by the state are of  an aggressive manner.156 The fact  that 
the state did invest large amounts in market ing prior to 2001, when market ing of  
foreign lotteries were almost non- ex istent 157, is incoherent with the intent ions 
adduced by the state. 
New forms of distribut ion have cont inuously made gambling even more accessible, 
inter alia through grocery stores158 (3 800 agents), Internet and mobile phones. 
Svenska Spel’ s total of 6 300 agents, whereby 3 400 are bett ing agents, and ATG’s 
total of 2 030 agents have steadily increased during the years.159 Further, the control 
is not rigorous as merely 200 controls were conducted on the total of  2 200 situated 
localit ies (7 100 gambling machines). During 2004 and 2003, 624 and 598 controls 
were conducted respect ively.160 
The fact is that Sweden has a gambling addict ion amount ing to 2 percent (whereby 
0,6 percent are pathological gamblers), while Britain despite their competit ive 
market, albeit  very restrict ive market ing, only amounts to 1,2 percent. In Britain, for 
example, market ing through the media of television is prohibited for gambling 
companies.161 
Great sports contribut ion is emphasized by the state as a cogent reason to keep the 
monopoly. However, facts show that only 25 percent, of Svenska Spel’ s total 
earnings, for 2004 of SEK 4,8 billions, accrued to the sports, const itut ing merely 1,2 
billion162. Furthermore, the government  has earmarked SEK 1,4 bill ions for 2005163, 
but it  is st il l a poorly contribut ion and decept ive since it  is pretended to be more 
substant ial in the public debate. Attent ion should also be directed to the fact that 
heavily discounted164 sponsoring is included in the SEK 1,2 bi llion- post, which in 
reality const itutes market ing of state act ivit ies. In an open market , implying the 
ex istence of more effect ive companies, the total earnings would be far greater. 
Hence, the same amount of  sponsorship could accrue to sports from the gambling 
companies, especially as there would be no room for heavily discounts.  
Another deceptive fact  is that merely 14 million is earmarked for preventing 
gambling addict ion, summing up to 0,46 per thousand of the gambling monopoly’ s 
turnover. Contribut ion in the work against  gambling addict ion is not even 
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comparable to contribut ions against alcohol and narcot ic addict ions, albeit  their 
greater social repercussions.165 Approx imately 100 000 have a gambling problem, 
while approx imately 25 000 are pathological, that  is, having an addict ion. This can 
be compared to the est imat ion of 16 000 and 26 000 abusers of  alcohol and 
narcot ics respect ively.166 The amounts invested in the work against  these addict ions 
are ten folded the amounts invested in the work against  gambling addict ions. 
The fusion between Tipst jänst and Penninglotteriet forming Svenska Spel, instead of  
the proposed transference of Tipst jänst to the public benefit  organizat ions, has 
evident ly shown the disinclinat ion to let the public receive all gambling earnings.167 
Swedish gambling companies168 have conciliated on ethical guidelines regarding 
market ing, but even ethical market ing has as its object ive to encourage and incite 
gambling; therefore the Swedish state’ s inducement is an air of  ridicule. 
The Swedish state is of  another opinion in the quest ion of the market act ivit ies. 
Aggressive market ing and new forms of distribut ion are upheld as a response to the 
internat ional competit ion that distorts the Swedish gambling monopoly. These 
act ivit ies cannot  serve as evidence for undermining the adduced main object ive by 
the state. Reasonably, in order to canalise the exist ing gambling demand, one 
cannot refuse the companies, granted a license, from act ively introducing new 
products, conduct market ing efforts or offer new forms of distribut ion as these 
safeguards a higher consumer protect ion and minimizes the risks of 
embezzlement.169 Moreover, market ing costs for outdoor-  and television 
advert isements have been reduced 170 by 20 percent and are back at the levels of 
2001.171 The importance of restrict ive market ing has been expressed by the 
government in proposit ion 2002/ 03:93 p. 23. Rigorous controls have also resulted 
in withdrawals of almost  200 token machines from restaurants where gambling has 
become a too dominating element.172  
A free market  would render a worse stat ist ic concerning the gambling addict ion in 
Sweden. Contrary to the stat ist ic above, off icial studies have shown the opposite to 
what the gambling companies are adducing.173  
The contr ibut ion is of vital importance in the public interest and a deregulat ion of 
the gambling market would probably lead to def icits and ruin many of the sport  
organizat ions around the country.174 However, this object ive is secondary in relat ion 
to the public interest, but would not  even be an object ive in an open market  as the 
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surplus only would accrue to shareholders. Moreover, a poll175 has shown that more 
than 46 percent think that Svenska Spel’ s sports contribut ion is less than SEK 10 
millions, while 86 percent guess that it  is less than SEK 1 bill ion. This serves as an 
evidence of  that Svenska Spel’ s market ing is neither poorly nor deceptive in relat ion 
to the perception of the general public. 
It  is important to bear in mind that it  is not the responsibility of  Svenska Spel to treat  
people with gambling problems, but to work preventat ive and offer consumers the 
possibility to control their gambling. To compare gambling with alcohol or narcot ics 
is not fair since the latter ’ s greater repercussions. For the year 2005, SEK 14 millions 
have been earmarked which should be compared to the amounts contributed by the 
foreign gambling companies and not with the turnover of Svenska Spel. 
Regarding the fusion forming Svenska Spel, there were a number of reasons, 
whereas gaining large- scale benefits were one of  the main object ives. A fusion 
would also result  in decreased market ing as only one company would market its 
products, instead of two.176 
The ethical guidelines, conciliated by the Swedish gambling operators, are more far 
reaching than any other general consumer protect ion as far as market ing is 
concerned, whereby it  serves its object ive sat isfyingly. 
3.6.2New Products 
A second group of arguments derive from the manner in which new products have 
been launched. At present, Svenska Spel offers more than 20 products while ATG 
of fers at least 10 products, see Appendix  B and C. The aggressive increase of offers 
are represented by more gambling opportunit ies for each product (Joker, Kung Keno, 
Lotto etcetera, see Appendix  B and C), but also of shorter intervals between bet  and 
payback, and the lat ter has according to research proven to be the most addict ive 
form of gambling.177 Other products that have been crit icised are Jack Vegas and 
Miss Vegas, introduced in the 1990s, since their close equivalent; the one armed 
bandits were abolished in 1978 for being too addict ive. The opening of the 
internat ional casinos Cosmopol serves another measure in contrast  to the 
conclusions that  quick gambling and gambling in casino environment are two of the 
most addict ive forms of  gambling. Further, recently the Swedish government gave 
Svenska Spel permission to organize Internet poker 178 despite the dissuasion of 
Folkhälsoinst itutet 179 -  to deny its addict ive character would be ignorant. By this, 
Sweden will be the f irst  state lottery to offer online poker. The permit is, however, 
combined with condit ions in respect of its addict ive character. According to Douglas 
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Roos (CEO of Ladbrokes), the restrict ions imposed on Svenska Spel could easily be 
complied by the gambling companies, if they were given permission to operate.180 
An argued fact behind the prohibit ion in § 38 is to obstruct foreign based gambling, 
since Swedish framework cannot be imposed on them. Notwithstanding this, the 
ex istence of internat ional co operat ions enables Swedish consumers to place bets in 
foreign countries, inter alia, regarding Vikinglotto181 and ATG182. Therefore, Svenska 
Spel and ATG are market ing gambling act ivit ies organised abroad, but this privilege 
is solely reserved to them. Internat ional horse bett ing amounts a turnover of SEK 
606 millions183 whereby SEK 537 millions derive from bets placed in Sweden, which 
makes it ext remely prof itable for ATG to run the internat ional pool of bett ing. 
New products are just if ied by the Swedish state in the same way as the aggressive 
market ing, which is mainly to enable to face the internat ional competit ion and the 
borderless character that  gambling has become. One of the assignments of Svenska 
Spel, imbedded in the permission granted by the government, is to meet ex ist ing 
gambling demands of  Swedish consumers, whereby it  is inevitable not to offer new 
products or to introduce internat ional casinos. A gambling responsibility policy was 
adopted throughout the group of  companies during 2004 and a specif ic staff 
department was appointed called “Samhälle och ansvar” (Society and responsibility). 
Concrete measures taken comprise of the enforcement  of  stake limitat ions, the 
gambling card, voluntarily suspensions, registrat ion of personal gambling budget, 
the possibility to f reeze accounts, limited opening hours and the offering of less 
aggressive products as an alternat ive to ex ist ing products offers. So called sensit ive 
games are imposed an age limit , gambling on credit  is being counteracted while 
healthy gambling environments are being promoted. Every gambling agent, as well 
as every lot tery t icket , has information with the support  lines offered by 
Folkhälsoinst itutet. Regarding casinos, permission granted by the government  
should clearly express a restrict ive market ing of the casinos.184 In addit ion, the 
negative effects of the public health is suppressed by the state by (a) keeping the 
level of pay back down185 as well as (b) the number of  gambling agents. Internet 
poker has, by the way, been combined with several condit ions in order to secure 
consumer interests. 
3.6.3Legislat ive Measures 
The third group of  arguments comprise of legislat ive measures, in part icular the 
criminalisat ion of , as stated in § 54, the prohibit ion of promoting part icipat ion in 
                                              
180
 Kuriren, (2005- 12- 01). 
181
 Collaborat ion with Nordic countr ies and Estonia. 
182
 Collaborat ion with Norwegian gambling company Norsk Rikstoto, but  V75 has been launched in 
Holland, Germany, Austria and Estonia, according to the annual report  of ATG, (2004). 
183
 Annual report  of ATG, (2004) 
184
 Prop. 1998/ 99:80 p. 25. 
185
 (1) St rykt ipset  and Målt ipset  maximum 50 %, (2) Lot to max imum 45 %, (3) Number games with daily or 
more frequent draws maximum 55 %, (4) Other number games maximum 45 %, (5) Oddset maximum 85 
%, (5) ATG has a permit  of 65- 85 % max imum pay back. 
Chapter III – Swedish framework 
 
43 
foreign lot teries by virtue of § 38, which was removed in the Act  of 1994, but later 
reintroduced and current ly valid. As stated before, these provisions do not  appear to 
apply to the state as the internat ional co operat ions are allowed to ex ist. In the light  
of  Gambelli, the Commission has lodged a complaint stat ing the criminal offence in 
§ 54 of the Lottery act not to be proport ional in relat ion to its object ive.186 
Moreover, § 27 in the Lottery Act  discriminates foreign subjects as only state owned 
companies can be granted permission to organise gambling on token machines.187 A 
foreign company owned by the Swedish state would, however appear to, lose its 
foreign character. 
The ex istence of the Lottery Act has been asserted by the state as suff icient in the 
work to counteract the economical, social and personal harmful effects of 
gambling 188. Despite this, risks of f rauds and consumers interest  are only being 
described in general terms and not  put in a concrete form.189 It  appears as the state 
presumes foreign organisers of pursuing fraudulent behaviour, but there are no 
empirical proofs that such behaviour occurs or would occur. Moreover, it  would go 
against any market economic principle to believe that  such behaviour would be able 
to cont inue to ex ist in a compet it ive environment , part ly due to legal aspects, part ly 
due to the badwill it  would cause. Therefore it  cannot be just if ied to restrict  all 
companies on this ground. 
More of a lack of a legislat ive measure is the negligence of the Public Procurement  
Act. According to the the state- run Public Procurement Authority, (Nämnden för 
Offent lig Upphandling), Svenska Spel must abide by the Swedish Public Procurement  
Act. Nevertheless, Svenska Spel has always decided not  to abide by the Act. 
In conclusion, there are possibilit ies for the state to control the gambling and lottery 
market without excluding other subjects than non prof it  associat ions. Numerous of  
areas ex ist where private undertakings are allowed to provide services and products, 
despite the harmful effects it  might cause from t ime to t ime. In the end, it  is 
evident ly shown that the primary reason, for keeping the gambling monopoly, is 
economical.  
In the area of  legislat ive measures, the Swedish state relies on the Swedish Supreme 
Administrat ive Court, since it  has concluded § 38 of not being in quarrel with EC- law 
and § 54 was considered proport ional to its object ive. In addit ion, Gambelli is not  
applicable to the Swedish measures since there are too vast discrepancies between 
the measures in quest ion. The reason for which a thorough test of proport ionality 
was assigned in Gambelli was due to ECJ’s doubtfulness whether the Italian 
measures could be just if ied by overriding reasons of public interest.190 
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As far as § 27 is concerned, it  cannot  be considered to discriminate. The wording of  
the paragraph, and the pract ise of the same191, is applicable without  dist inct ion. The 
exclusion embraces all commercial operators, domest ic, as well as, foreign 
applicants. 
Frauds and other criminal act ivit ies are commonly known to be attracted to 
gambling markets due to the vast amount of money involved. In a debate art icle192, 
Bosse Ringholm (Swedish minister of f inance) emphasized that “risks of fraud and 
other type of criminality is tackled by, part ly police measurements, part ly legal 
framework stat ing that  all gambling act ivit ies should be conducted by Swedish 
undertakings controlled by the state”.193 
The Public Procurement  Act is not applicable to Svenska Spel’ s operat ions. Suppliers 
considered neglected have the possibility to refer the quest ion to the nat ional Courts, 
which have the author ity to decide how the Act  should be interpreted. In the end, it  is a 
quest ion for the ECJ to consider.194 
Conclusion of the state, is that  the gambling monopoly is not breaching EC- law. The 
object ive of the monopoly is to supply a healthy and secure gambling market where 
social considerat ions are of priority, but at  the same t ime, where the variety of  
gambling demands is sat isf ied. Therefore, the market is regulated and act ivit ies are 
privileged to a few number companies without any prof it  interests. The surplus shall 
accrue to public interest  such as child-  and youth organizat ions, sports and other 
non- governmental organizat ions, horse racing industry, culture and public purse.195 
Also, in recent case law the Swedish Supreme Administrat ive Court  concluded 
Swedish legislat ion to be coherent with EC- law.196  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Analysis 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Applicability of an Act ivity with EC- law 
In this chapter, an analysis will be done by an init ial out line on how the applicability 
of  an act ivity, in perspect ive of EC- law, is conducted, by looking at f ive quest ions. 
This sect ion will elucidate its relevance, as well as impact, and will be explained in 
the following headlines. The structure for the analysis derives f rom, the author and 
attorney at Bar of Brussels, Keuleers’  work.197 The f irst  quest ion derives f rom the 
nature of the Treaty, the second from Schindler, the third, fourth and f if th quest ions 
derive from Gebhard.198 
1. Is the act ivity economic? 
2. Is the act ivity applicable to goods or services? 
3. Is the restrict ion discriminatory? 
4. Can the restrict ion be just if ied? 
5. Is the restrict ion necessary and proport ionate? 
Furthermore, European case law, especially Gambelli will be elucidated with a 
clarifying aim. Swedish case law and its legislat ion will also be analyzed as well as 
the predicaments of  the Swedish framework. In the end, the quest ions of research 
for this report  will be addressed.  
4.1.1Does the Regulat ion Concerned Relate to an Economic 
Activity? 
Even if  the European integrat ion embraces more than economical f ields, it  is of 
paramount importance to examine if  a regulat ion relates to an economic act ivity, 
since the Treaty only applies to economic act ivit ies, see sect ion 2.2 The Core of the 
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European Community. In early EC case law, some Member States advocated 
gambling of not being an economic act ivity199, since lotteries have the character of 
relaxat ion and amusement, and not an economic object ive as it  is based on chance. 
By virtue of this, ECJ would have been prevented to inquire whether nat ional 
restrict ions were in breach of EC- law. However, ECJ held that  it  was evident from the 
facts of the cases, as they were presented to the Court, that the economic 
signif icance of gambling act ivit ies was considerable in all the Member States. It  
remarked, by referring to case 13/ 76 (Doná), that import  of goods or providence of  
services in exchange for remunerat ion shall be considered as an economic act ivity as 
stated in the Treaty. The elements of chance, relaxat ion and amusement did not  
prevent the act ivity from being an economic.200 
4.1.2Does the Economic Act ivity Relate to the Free Provision of 
Services or Goods? 
It  is essential to, albeit  not  very easy to make, a dist inct ion between goods and 
services, as referred to in sect ion 2.5 Free Movement  of  Services and sect ion 2.9.1 
Schindler. In the latter sect ion, ECJ considered the act ivit ies of sending 
advert isements and applicat ion forms as specific steps in the organizat ion of a 
lottery, which could not as such be considered as the f inal object ive. Therefore, the 
act ivit ies were considered to fall within the scope of services, and not of  goods. ECJ 
determined the act ivity by looking at the nature of its principal act ivity, according to 
the principle “accessorium sequitur”.201 By not considering gambling in the scope of 
goods, the doctrine of Cassis de Dijon and art icle 31 of the Treaty do not apply. 
Gambling, as a service, dist inguish itself  f rom a state monopoly of a commercial 
character, as art icle 31 of the Treaty aims at protect ing suppliers of goods. In the 
area of gambling, the suppliers are lim ited due to the nature of gambling as it  is 
provided as a service to the end consumer, and not  as a physical product. Moreover, 
during the last decade, gambling has evolved to be provided virtually as well, which 
has made its nature even clearer and assignable to the nature of a service. 
Despite that goods were involved in both the Schindler and Läärä cases, ECJ 
considered the act ivit ies of  being provided for remunerat ion by an operator to 
enable persons to part icipate in a game of chance with the hope of winning. Thus, 
by virtue of art icle 50, they had to be considered as services. Furthermore, in Läärä, 
ECJ stated that “(I)n those circumstances, games consist ing of  the use, in return from 
money payment, of slot machines such as those at issue in the main proceedings, 
                                              
199
 C- 275/ 92, Schindler, paragraph 16. 
200
 C- 275/ 92, Schindler, paragraph 19.  
201
 Expressed in case law, for example, C- 368/ 95, Familiapress, Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro. 
The case concerned compet it ions published in magazines in the form of crosswords or puzzles. As the 
Court  stated, part icularly in paragraph 23 of that  judgment, such games, organised only on a small scale 
and for insignificant  stakes, do not  const itute an economic act ivity in their  own right  but  are merely one 
aspect  of the editorial content  of a magazine. 
Chapter IV – Analysis 
 
47 
must be regarded as gambling, which is comparable to the lotteries forming the 
subject of the Schindler judgment”.202 
Contrary to Schindler, the Läärä slot machines themselves were goods in the strict  
meaning of art icle 30 of the Treaty. However, as the Court lacked suf f icient  
information in relat ion to the effects of  the adopted restrict ive measure, it  was 
forced to conclude to be unable to answer the quest ion whether the nat ional 
measure was incompatible with art icle 30 or not .203 
4.1.3If  there is a Restr ict ion in Place, is it  Discriminat ing? 
Member States are only allowed to impose and maintain rest rict ions provided that no 
dist inct ion is made on grounds of nat ionality or residence204, according to art icle 49 
of  the Treaty. Therefore, besides its obvious purpose to prohibit  direct and indirect  
discriminat ion of foreign services, it  also serves the purpose of the adopt ion of non-
discriminatory rules to foreign services.205 In Saeger, ECJ stated that “art icle 49 of the 
Treaty requires not only the eliminat ion of all discriminat ion against  a person 
providing services on the ground of his nat ionality but also the abolit ion of any 
restrict ion, even if  it  applies without dist inct ion to nat ional providers of services and 
to those of other Member States, when it  is liable to prohibit  or otherwise impede 
the act ivit ies of a provider of services established in another Member State where he 
lawfully provides similar services”206. 
None of the regulat ions in Schindler, Läärä or Zenatt i, were discriminatory on 
grounds of nat ionality. However in Gambelli, ECJ held that  “(I)t  is for the nat ional 
court to consider whether the manner in which the condit ions for submitt ing 
invitat ions to tender for licences to organise bets on sport ing events are laid down 
enables them in pract ice to be met more easily by Italian operators than by foreign 
operators. If  so, those condit ions do not sat isfy the requirement of non-
discriminat ion”.207  
4.1.4Is the Restrict ion Just if ied? 
A non- discriminat ing restrict ive measure has to be just if ied by derogations provided 
in the Treaty. Art icle 46 of the Treaty provides derogations on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health. These are of socio- economic reasons208 and 
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shall be viewed holist ically, in that they shall all be taken into account , according to 
case law209. 
Cogent reasons expressed by the ECJ are to limit  the exploitat ion of  human passion 
for gambling; curtail the negative social and f inancial effects of excessive gambling; 
prevent criminal behaviour as fraud, money laundering and even tax  evasion.210 
Notably, the allocat ion of prof it  f rom gambling act ivit ies to charity or other public 
interest purposes is not without relevance, but cannot serve as a cogent  reason.211 
Consequent ly, the provided freedoms within the EU may be overridden to safeguard 
the wellbeing of consumers, in part icular the recipients of a service, and more 
generally to guarantee order in society212. In Schindler, where these arguments were 
developed for the f irst  t ime in connect ion with gambling services, the Court  
concluded on this point that in the absence of  any EC legislat ion, it  was up to each 
of  the Member States to consider what should be appropriate to protect their 
internal social order 213. 
Further, it  seems as if  many of cogent  reasons are presumed by the Court  to be 
applicable in all Member States and without any need of elaborat ion. However, by 
virtue of most recent case law it  seems as the burden of proof may have shif ted 
slight ly, see sect ion 4.3.2 A Slight Shif t  in the Burden of Proof . 
4.1.5Is the Restrict ion Necessary and Proportionate? 
Early case law established that any measure adopted, falling within the scope of 
derogations, has to be necessary, in order to guarantee the achievement  of the 
intended aim, and proport ionate, for example not  to go further than necessary.214 
In the f irst  gambling case, the Schindler case, Advocate General Gulmann made 
following statement ref lect ing the criterions of necessity and proport ionality: “(T)he 
decisive quest ions are thus in my view in any event  whether the interest  of  society 
invoked by the States are so fundamental that  in the area in quest ion they can just ify 
the ex ist ing restrict ions and whether the rules in quest ion are object ively necessary 
in order to achieve the object ive pursued and are also reasonable in relat ion to that  
object ive”215. 
Advocate General Gulmann did however conclude that it  was not  possible to ident ify 
less restrict ive measures for achieving the pursued object ives considering the 
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unknown implicat ions of an open and competit ive gaming sector 216. Advocate 
General Fennelly added in Zenatt i that i t  was for the nat ional Court to consider 
whether those two condit ions were met 217. In Läärä, Advocate General La Pergola 
concluded the Finish law, by grant ing RAY exclusive right on gambling machines, 
not  to meet the criterion of proport ionality. But the Court saw it  dif ferent ly and did 
not  follow his opinion. Interest ingly, in Gambelli the Court concluded, similarly as in 
Zenatt i, that “(I)t  is for the nat ional court to determine whether the nat ional 
legislat ion, taking account of the detailed rules for its applicat ion, actually serves the 
aims which might just ify it , and whether the restrict ions it  imposes are 
disproport ionate in the light  of  those aims”218. More interest ingly, Advocate General 
Alber did not consider the quest ions to lie within the discret ional power of the 
Member State since the object ive required for a just if icat ion was not cogent  due to 
inconsistent polit ics and lack of overriding reasons of  general interest. It  can only be 
disproport ional with a pain of criminal penalt ies, Alber concluded. 
Contrary to Gambelli and the Italian provisions, § 54 of the Swedish Lot tery Act  only 
considers the organizer of  a lottery as unlawful and not the part icipant. Thus, the 
frameworks and the circumstances are not easily comparable between Sweden and 
Italy vis- à- vis Gambelli. 
It  cannot be stressed enough that two dif ferent  approaches, both can be 
proport ionate in relat ion to the object ive pursued and therefore necessary as well.219 
Thus, one Member State could prohibit  certain gambling act ivit ies, while another 
Member State could advocate a less restrict ive regime, for example by grant ing a 
limited number of l icenses -  and both measures could be cogent. Nonetheless, in 
order to invoke, for example, the protect ion of consumers to just ify a restrict ive 
measure, some legal disposit ion concerning that  object ive should be inserted in the 
legal inst rument imposing the restrict ion; otherwise the restrict ion as such would 
not  stand the test  of crit icism. 
According to the Swedish government, the reason for ECJ referring the Italian 
nat ional Court to make a thorough proport ionality test, evidently shown in Gambelli, 
was due to the doubtfulness of ECJ whether the Ital ian measures could be just if ied 
by overriding reasons of general interest.220 
National provisions restrict ing the fundamental f reedoms, which are imposed 
penalt ies, are subject to a strict  test of proport ionality.221 In Gambelli, Advocate 
General Alber considered the pain of criminal penalt ies for merely receiving bets 
f lagrant ly in quarrel with the principle of proport ionality. Criminal sanct ion is the 
outermost remedy only to be used when other remedies or instruments are unable 
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to secure the public interest sat isfyingly.222 The Court , however, delegated the 
quest ion, giving the nat ional Court  discret ional power of assessment. The ECJ has in 
cases concerning “sensit ive” quest ions (such as gambling) chosen to conduct a 
limited proport ionality test . ECJ has ascertained that since a proport ionality test  
presupposes an analysis of actual and legal considerat ions pertaining to the 
circumstances of the Member State in quest ion, the nat ional court  is more suitable 
to conduct this assessment than the ECJ.223 A problem arisen from the tradit ion of 
referring the case back to the nat ional courts has therefore been the discrepancy in 
the assessments of  equivalent measures.224 Surprisingly, the Swedish Supreme 
Administrat ive Court did not refer the case225 to the ECJ226, since no need was 
concluded. In case of  a doubt, a court should refer a case to the ECJ227. According to 
the Swedish Court, there was no doubt. European case law (referr ing to Schindler, 
Läärä, Zenatt i and Gambelli) had stated that  it  is up to the nat ional Court  to assess if  
nat ional f rameworks are acceptable.228  
Further, the criteria of  proport ionality seem to play a less prominent role in the light  
of  EC- law than adduced by SSP in Gambelli. When several alternat ives are at hand, it  
lies within the discret ionary assessment  of  the Member State to choose which one, 
as long as the alternat ive is not disproport ionate considering the aimed object ive 
(Läärä paragraph 39 and Gambelli paragraph 75).229 Notably, this is not  how the 
proport ionality test is used to be carried out; there is one dimension more. If  there 
are several alternat ives, it  is not suff ice to choose a measure that  is not burdensome, 
it  must be the least burdensome available.230 Its pract ical effect can be discussed of 
having lit t le effect in the absence of  several alternat ives, but the statement is 
perplex ing. This reversed proport ionality test, was adduced by the Swedish Supreme 
Administrat ive Court when it  faced the challenge. But usually, a complete test of  
proport ionality should be done231, which has been advocated 232 in the light of 
Gourmet 233. 
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In Gourmet , the Swedish state adduced public health to just ify prohibit ion to market  
alcohol products in periodical magazines. The Swedish Market Court  concluded that  
a large supply of marketed alcohol products already ex isted in the Swedish society, 
whereby a prohibit ion was very lit t le effect ive in proport ion to its object ive to 
prohibit  the promot ion of part icipat ion.  
Given the above- mentioned, as there already ex ists a large supply of  marketed 
gambling-  and lottery products, the prohibit ion in § 38 of the Lottery Act ought  to 
be viewed in the same way – that  it  has very lit t le effect in proport ion to i ts claimed 
object ive. The Swedish Supreme Administrat ive Court  omit ted to do a proport ionality 
test in order to assure the use of a less restrict ive measure and st il l at tain the social 
polit ical object ives. In the light of the Gourmet case, a framework with social 
polit ical object ives should be imposed a proport ionality test. An examinat ion of a 
measure, that might lead to an incarcerat ion of up to two years, should face the 
same outcome regardless of  if  it  is in the light of being “not disproport ionate” 
(reversed proport ionality) or “proport ionate” (usual proport ionality).234 
4.2 European Case Law  
The European case law, prior to Gambelli, has clearly shown the chosen path by ECJ 
-  the nat ional Courts were given a vast discret ionary power of assessment.235 
However, Gambelli forms a dividing line.236 The aftermath has in some national case 
law upheld the prior path. Elsewhere, for example in Germany, some Courts have 
held imposed restrict ions incoherent with EC- law in the absence of a consistent  
gambling policy and, thus, the imposed restrict ions could not be maintained, see 
sect ion 2.10 Af termath of Gambelli. In general, the judgments are rendered by the 
lower Courts and appeals have been lodged, hence, the legal batt le cont inues. 
4.3 Clarifying Gambelli 
Gambelli is a good example of the truth lying in the eyes of the beholder. On one 
side, Gambelli is being viewed as a prolongat ion of the Court ’ s history to give 
discret ional power of assessment  to the nat ional Courts, with regards to the 
compatibility of the EC- law framework of a measure. On the f lipside, it  is argued 
that  ECJ restricted the margin of appreciat ion as the scope of interpretat ion was 
narrowed to an extent  leading the nat ional Court  to no other conclusion than 
implied by the ECJ.237 
4.3.1Guidelines Narrowing the Scope of Interpretat ion 
Undisputed is the fact that each quest ion was given guidelines. The dif ferences of  
opinions are composed of how narrow the guidelines should be interpreted. It  is, 
however, a known fact that  ECJ often excludes any room for interpretat ion when it  
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refers back to the nat ional Courts.238 The nat ional Courts have the right  to formulate 
their quest ions, however, ECJ do have the freedom to interpret and even reformulate 
the addressed quest ion.239 
Analysing the verdict from this point  of view gives following at  hand: paragraph 70 
is a guideline for paragraph 71, paragraph 72 is a guideline for paragraph 73 and 
paragraph 74 is a guideline for paragraph 75. It  can also be advocated in favour of  
an implied tone within the delegations made in paragraphs 71, 73 and 75.  
Regarding the prohibit ion to discriminate, paragraph 70 states that “… the 
restrict ions imposed by the Italian rules in the f ield of invitat ions to tender must be 
applicable without dist inct ion: they must apply in the same way and under the same 
condit ions to operators established in Italy and to those from other Member States 
alike”.  
The delegation in paragraph 71 is expressed by ”(I)t  is for the nat ional court to 
consider whether the manner in which the condit ions for submitt ing invitat ions to 
tender for licences to organise bets on sport ing events are laid down enables them 
in pract ice to be met more easily by Italian operators than by foreign operators. If  
so, those condit ions do not sat isfy the requirement of non- discriminat ion.” By virtue 
of  this, the nat ional Courts were given very lit t le to rule upon since it  de facto was 
more easily for Italian operators to organize bets on sport ing events, since others 
were prevented. 
On the topic of a proport ionality test, in respect of the pain of criminal penalt ies, 
paragraph 72 gives the following guidelines: “… the restrict ions imposed by the 
Italian legislat ion must not go beyond what is necessary to attain the end in view. In 
that contex t the nat ional court must consider whether the criminal penalty imposed 
on any person who from his home connects by internet to a bookmaker established 
in another Member State is not disproport ionate in the light of  the Court ’s case-
law…especially where involvement in bet t ing is encouraged in the contex t of games 
organised by licensed nat ional bodies.” By stat ing this, ECJ emphasizes the 
circumstances of  the Italian state to encourage gambling whereby it  must be 
considered disproport ionate with a criminal penalty imposed on those receiving 
bets, albeit  their lack of permit. 
Delegation was formulated in paragraph 73 as ”(T)he nat ional court will also need to 
determine whether the imposit ion of  rest rict ions, accompanied by criminal penalt ies 
of  up to a year’s imprisonment, on intermediaries who facilitate the provision of  
services by a bookmaker in a Member State other than that in which those services 
are offered by making an internet connect ion to that  bookmaker available to bettors 
at their premises is a restrict ion that goes beyond what  is necessary to combat  
fraud, especially where the supplier of the service is subject in his Member State of  
establishment  to a regulat ion entailing controls and penalt ies, where the 
intermediaries are lawfully const ituted, and where, before the statutory amendments 
                                              
238
 Bernitz, U. and Kjellgren, A. (2002), p. 154. 
239
 See 6/ 64, Costa/ E.N.E.L., 78/ 70, Deutsche Grammophon and 97/ 83, Melkunie. 
Chapter IV – Analysis 
 
53 
effected by Law No 388/ 00, those intermediaries considered that they were 
permit ted to t ransmit bets on foreign sport ing events.” In this regard, the ECJ 
recognizes that the UK established bookmaker is already subject to rigorous 
controls exercised in his country of establishment  by a private audit  company and by 
the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise. Thus, the requirement duplicates a 
condit ion already sat isf ied and imposes a double burden on the provider of  a 
service, and therefore it  cannot be just if ied.240 Same message is implied in the next 
statement in regard of the freedom of establishment enlightened by the principle of 
proport ionality. 
Concerning the proport ionality test relat ing to the freedom of establishment the 
Court stated in paragraph 74, “(A)s to the proport ionality of the Italian legislat ion in 
regard to the freedom of establishment, even if  the object ive of the authorit ies of a 
Member State is to avoid the risk of gaming licensees being involved in criminal or 
fraudulent act ivit ies, to prevent capital companies quoted on regulated markets of 
other Member States from obtaining licences to organise sport ing bets, especially 
where there are other means of checking the accounts and act ivit ies of such 
companies, may be considered to be a measure which goes beyond what is 
necessary to check fraud.”  
Final delegation, in paragraph 75, stated that  ”(I)t  is for the nat ional court to 
determine whether the nat ional legislat ion, taking account of the detailed rules for 
its applicat ion, actually serves the aims which might just ify it , and whether the 
restrict ions it  imposes are disproport ionate in the light of  those aims.” 
4.3.2A slight Shif t  in the Burden of Proof 
Overall it  has always been a Member State’ s obligat ion to show applicability of the 
derogations provided by the Treaty.241 The ECJ has according to Snell shown a 
tendency towards conduct ing, in perspect ive of art icle 46 of the Treaty, “…a fairly 
robust assessment of suitability and necessity of the nat ional rules”.242 However, in 
some areas, considered as sensit ive due to their social, polit ical and economic 
nature, such as gambling, the ECJ have been cautious in their proport ionality 
assessment.243 It  was not unt il in Lindman, the ECJ saw a need for stat ist ical displays. 
ECJ stated that “…the referring court discloses no stat ist ical or other evidence which 
enables any conclusion as to the gravity of  the r isks connected to playing games of 
chance or, a fort iori, the ex istence of  a part icular causal relat ionship between such 
risks and part icipat ion by nat ionals of the Member State concerned in lotteries 
organised in other Member States.”244 Apparent ly, ECJ lacked reason to assert a 
correlat ion between the risks of gambling addict ion and other social effects 
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connected to the part icipat ion of  lot teries vis- à- vis the part icipat ion in foreign 
lotteries. 
In this case, it  appears as a slight shif t  in the burden of proof was established. 
Consequent ly, it  ought to be harder to use, inter alia criminal risks as derogat ion in 
those cases the operator is imposed control in his Member State. Considering this, 
the Swedish state has neither insinuated nor proved any ex istence of certain risks 
between foreign lotteries and/ or e- gambling and the market ing of  them as such. 
4.4 Swedish Case Law 
The Swedish case law is characterized by the unwillingness to trial the Swedish 
provisions by referring quest ions to the ECJ, as ECJ’s case law has been interpreted 
in favour of the Swedish provisions and the gambling monopoly. However, Sweden 
has their own Gambelli case245 now. It  is current ly pending. 
In case, RegR 5819- 01, the Court  omit ted to do a proport ionality test. In the light  of 
the above- mentioned considerat ions and argumentat ion, there are strong 
indicat ions point ing towards that  such a test should have been made. It  would be 
very surprising if  the ECJ would pass the opportunity to give the Swedish nat ional 
Court guidelines, in accordance with Gambelli, and a reprimand concerning the 
proport ionality test. The verdict can be crit icised for being a too general collected 
assessment than a proport ionality test in perspect ive of EC- law. The construct ive 
crit ic is that the Swedish nat ional court should have separated the parts of the 
measures that could be considered as disproport ional, and further declared these as 
incoherent with EC- law.246 
4.5 The Lottery Act 
The Swedish legislat ion makes a dist inct ion between nat ional and foreign subjects, 
principally shown in paragraphs 15, 27 and 38, but also 17, 19 and 22 by its 
reference to § 15. §15 states: “Permits to arrange true lotteries must only be granted 
to Swedish legal ent it ies that are non- prof it  associat ions.”247  
The Swedish framework is advocated by the gambling companies to be 
discriminat ing, since Swedish legal ent it ies that  are non- prof it  organizat ions have 
the best pre- requisites to be granted a permission to organize a lottery.248 However, 
the government as well as the Swedish Supreme Administrat ive Court, argues that 
there is no dif ference in excluding, domestic as well as foreign subjects, as long as 
all commercial part ies are enclosed by the wording of paragraph 15, and the pract ice 
of  the same. Either way, commercial part ies are excluded regardless of nat ionality. 
The Swedish Supreme Administrat ive Court  commented the quest ion by 
acknowledging the unlucky wording. However, the measure was not considered as 
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discriminat ing since it  does not include any negative special treatment  of foreign 
subjects.249 Next quest ion is more interest ing -  can the discriminat ion be just if ied? 
This will be answered in sect ion 4.6 Answering the Quest ions of Research. 
It  appears as the object ive is not to discriminate foreign subjects but to exclude all  
commercial operators. However, the pract ical effect  is discriminat ing in my opinion, 
since no foreign subjects are obtaining a permit as it  is only given to subjects in 
solidarity with the Swedish state. In general, it  is pract ically impossible to operate a 
nat ional monopoly and avoid it  to render discriminat ing effects.250 Crucial for the 
assessment is therefore if  the restrict ion has actual market  effects through the 
condit ions set forth in the pract ise.251 Of secondary importance is if  the wording of 
an Act makes a formal equivalence between domestic and foreign operators, 
regardless of the intent ion of  the wording. 
Main targeted paragraph by the gambling companies is § 38, prohibit ing promotion 
of  part icipat ion in unlawful lot teries arranged within the country or in lotteries 
arranged outside the country; market ing that is. The paragraph offers an exemption 
by which ATG and Svenska Spel have enabled part icipat ion abroad with subjects 
collaborat ing with them and which have obtained similar permits from their 
governments. This is start ling, in my opinion, but  yet again the essence of  the 
quest ion in the view of the Swedish government; commercial lot teries are harmful as 
opposed to state owned lot teries. But, according to Gambelli, a state owned 
gambling market  can be harmful if  it  incites and encourages gambling to a degree 
where it  is crystallised that the primary object ive is f inancial benef it  of the public 
purse and not the protect ion of public interest. The cogent  reason will  be dif f icult  
for the State to show.252 In the end, the prohibit ion can only be maintained if  it  can 
be just if ied by overriding reasons which have been given a proport ional design.253 
The state’ s assignment to supply the Swedish populat ion with gambling can reach a 
point where it  becomes too harmful to just ify it . However, not  to forget, Sweden, as 
well as other Member States, joined the EU with the knowledge, and foremost  the 
claim of maintaining the gambling monopoly as well as other monopolies. Thus, this 
is a polit ical quest ion of highest rank. 
4.6 Answering the Quest ions of Research 
The quest ions out lined in the f irst  chapter of this report  will  be answered in this 
sect ion as a concluding sect ion.  
First quest ion concerned the law in force within EC and Sweden. By virtue of early 
case law it  was established that (1) gambling is an economic act ivity that (2) falls 
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under the scope of services and (3) measures restrict ing gambling cannot be (3a) 
discriminat ing, (3b) lawful unless just if ied by derogations given in art icle 46 of the 
Treaty or (3c) lawful unless proport ionate in relat ion to its aim. The Gambelli verdict  
was clearly in its message, albeit  its applicability can be discussed back and forth. 
Any authority of  a Member State incit ing and encouraging gambling loses its 
possibility to invoke public order concerns relat ing to the need to reduce 
opportunit ies for bett ing in order to just ify its restrict ive measures. When the 
Swedish Supreme Administrat ive Court  had the opportunity to refer a case to the 
ECJ, it  chose not to. Swedish case law has merely followed the Gambelli verdict  by 
concluding that  Swedish measures are in conjunct ion with EC- law. However, the 
f inancial impact was not iced by the Swedish Court  but was not  considered as a 
primary object ive of the Swedish framework. 
The second, and its entailed, quest ion were if  the Swedish provisions are in breach 
of  the Treaty and, if  so, if  they can be just if ied. It  is inevitable for a monopoly to not  
breach a principle based on free movement of services; otherwise it  would not be a 
monopoly as such. But, the quest ion is vaster than this, and the main quest ion to be 
answered is if  the Swedish provisions can be just if ied. I believe there to be cogent  
indicat ions point ing towards incoherence between the Swedish gambling monopoly 
and EC- law. Assuredly, Sweden did enter the European Union under the claim to 
maintain its monopoly, and this must serve as a standpoint. But  in the light of the 
message delivered through Gambelli, I am strongly quest ioning the Swedish 
gambling monopoly and its claimed object ives. It  appears as the primary object ive 
for keeping the monopoly is f inancial. As I see it , the Swedish authorit ies are incit ing 
and encouraging consumers in the same manner as the Italian authority was doing 
in Gambelli. There are discrepancies between the frameworks, but the circumstances 
can be compared. In Gambelli, Italy was grant ing concessions to bookmakers, while 
in Sweden, concessions are given to Svenska Spel and ATG for which they act 
through their distribut ion channels. The aggressive nature of the market ing and its 
pertaining costs can also be compared. The aggressive market ing has been 
established in preparatory work as well as in case law. The circumstances at hand 
ought to be in favour of  the gambling companies in the referred case to the ECJ. 
However, the polit ical impact of the quest ion can neither be forgotten nor denied. 
One should bear in mind that the Direct ive on Services is expected to be harmonised 
before 2010. On the whole, one hears from Brussels that  a liberalisat ion of the 
market is intended by 2008.254 
The third and fourth quest ions regard under what circumstances the monopoly 
could cont inue to ex ist and what could undermine the monopoly. New technologies, 
and foremost the Internet, have enabled new products and new distribut ion 
channels. New products and distribut ions (read accessibility) are presumed more 
addict ive as their aim is to give the most leverage for the gambling companies, 
including the state owned. Therefore, it  is of highest importance for Svenska Spel to 
have restrict ive market ing and not to act as a follower of the gambling companies’  
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products. Some products should be considered as too addict ive for Svenska Spel to 
of fer, but it  appears as Svenska Spel does not  hesitate to offer even the most  
addict ive products. Products already ex ist ing on the market are safer operated by 
Svenska Spel is their opinion.  
It  appears as the same circumstances nurturing the monopoly, on the f lip side, is 
undermining it . Thus, to safeguard the monopoly, market ing should be decreased, 
the pain of  criminal penalt ies should be abolished and a more restrict ive stand 
should incorporate the operat ion of new products such as online poker and 
gambling via mobile phones. Moreover, as indicat ions are point ing towards 
incoherence between Swedish provisions and EC- law, the Public Procurement Act  
ought to be reviewed, as well as the pract ise of the same, in order to enable for 
private operators to offer their services under comparable circumstances.  
In a future alternat ive framework, the legislat ion should be formed in manner which 
enables rat ional and cogent reasons.255 The wording in the provisions should be clear 
– if  the intent ion is not  to discriminate foreign subjects. The provision ought to have 
another wording, in example that  it  excludes commercial operators f rom the market  
and not foreign.256 Market ing should be allowed to all gambling operators regardless 
of  place of establishment, as the current  order appears disproport ional. Further, the 
procedure for grant ing concessions could safeguard the intended aims by having 
f ixed winning percents and it  ought to be possibly to f ind a way to allocate earnings 
for the benefit  of sport organizat ions.257 
In conclusion, it  appears as the operat ion of Svenska Spel increases gambling and 
not  the opposite. Under these presumed circumstances, the current monopoly order 
cannot be considered as effect ive and appropriate to its purpose -  to decrease 
gambling. The prohibit ion of promot ing part icipat ion in lotteries, in § 38 of the 
Lottery Act, therefore appears ineff icacious since advert ising via television from 
foreign gambling companies seems unstoppable as they are broadcasted from 
countries not imposed Swedish provisions (channel 3 and channel 5 broadcasted 
from Great Britain). The meaning the discret ional power of assessment given to the 
Member States does not exclude the chosen measure from being imposed 
appropriateness and necessity in proport ion to a legit imate aim. Principle of  
proport ionality const itutes a fundamental principle of EC- law, whereby nat ional 
courts should be imposed to conduct a proport ionality test where the real effect of 
the nat ional measure is tested, that is if  it  contributes in a consistent  and systematic 
manner to decrease gambling opportunit ies and limit  gambling. Such assessment 
must ref lect the actual appearance of the Swedish gambling market, in which there 
is a high supply of  gambling products and high exposure of market ing despite of, or 
thanks to, the monopoly. The object ive of Svenska Spel and the Swedish state 
appears to be to strengthen the competit iveness and not to suppress the supply of  
gambling.  
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Appendix  A – Dispersion of the Swedish gambling 
and lot tery market 
 
Dispersion of the Swedish gambling and lottery market, which for year 2004 
amounted to SEK 36,5 bill ion.258 
 
Year  Turnover (MSEK) Earning   
1999  31 505  8013   
2000  32 185  8206   
2001  33 261  8277   
2002  35 108  8376   
2003  36 197  8525   
2004  36 553  -   
2005  -   -    
 
Table 1 – Dispersion of the Swedish gambling and lot tery market  during the years 1999- 2004 
 
 
 
                                              
258
 Stat ist ic table from Lotteriinspekt ionen, 2005- 03- 22. 
Chart  1 -  Dispersion of Swedish gambling market  (2004)  
ATG , 29 % 
Public gambling, 
5 % 
Casino Cosmopol, 
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Restaurant 
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Remaining lotteries, 
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Svenska spel, 
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Svenska spel (other 
services), 34 % 
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Appendix  B – Products offered by Svenska Spel 
 
1897 Penninglotterier 
1926 A monthly draw 
1977 Two monthly draw 
1992 A scrape 
1934 Strykt ipset  
Tips- SM (nat ional 
championship) 
1954 Dramatenlotteriet  
1970 Nummerlotteriet  
1980 Lotto  
Wednesdays 2 draws, 
Saturdays 2 draws 
1-  5-  and 10- weeks 
2002 Lotto with Joker 
gives ex tra winning chance 
1983 Målt ipset  
1-  5-  and 10- weeks 
1984 Joker 
Together with Lotto, 
Strykt ipset, Italienska 
strykt ipset, Målt ipset  
1986 Oddset  (18- year age limit) 
Bomben, Stubinen 
Lången 
Matchen 
Mixen (Internet) 
Toppen 
1986 Triss 
2003 double t riss 
TV- scrape, monthly 
winnings 
1992 Keno 
 
 
1993 Italienska Strykt ipset 
1993 Viking Lotto 
1-  5-  and 10- weeks 
1994 Skrap- Bingo 
1995 Lotto Express (18- year 
age limit) 
1996 Skrappyramid 
1996 (Jack Vegas) 
1996 (Miss Vegas) 
2000 Greyhound racing 
Enkel 3, Dubbel 3, on 
weekends 
Vinn 3: daily 
Vinn 8: Sundays 
2002 Sunday Bingo 
2003 Tia 
2003 Lördagsgodis 
2003 Sportbagen 
2003 Brasilianska stryktipset  
2004 Europatipset  
2004  Skraplabyrint  
2004  Skrapkarta 
2004  Pick’n’ Click 
Trekortspoker 
Straffspark 
Tärning 
Diamantjakt 
Hjärter dam 
Yatzy 
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Appendix  C – Products offered by ATG 
 
 V5 
1987 Dagens Dubbel 
1993 V75 
1993 Harry Boy 
1994 V3 
1999 V65 (V64 1999- 2003) 
2001 Trio 
Vinnare och plats 
Raket  
Komb 
2004 Tvill ing 
 
Besides f rom the products listed above, ATG is part icipat ing in and of fering an 
internat ional gambling pool, which turnovers SEK 606 millions whereby SEK 537 
millions derive f rom bets placed in Sweden making it  ex tremely prof itable for ATG.259 
 
 
 
                                              
259
 Annual report  of ATG (2004). 
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APPENDIX D – Subvent ion in the work against 
gambling addict ion in relat ion to measures 
prevent ing alcohol and narcot ics 
 
The government has since 1997 
earmarked funding to the Public 
Health Inst itute (FHI) in order to 
suppress gambling addict ion. 
 
Year260 Kkr 
1997 2 000 
1998 2 000 
1999 4 000 
2000 4 000 
2001 6 000 
2002 4 000 
2003 9 000 
2004 14 000 
2005 13 900 
2006 15 000 
 
Table 2 – Subvent ion of gambling addict ion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
260
 See government ’ s budget  proposals for the 
years concerned. 
Subventions in the suppressing work 
against  addict ion of  alcohol and 
narcot ics.261 
 
 
Year Kkr 
1997 65 000 
1998 95 000 
1999 100 000 
2000 93 500 
2001 85 200 
2002 302 500 
2003 193 250 
2004 153 250 
2005 350 000 
2006 -  
 
Table 3 – Subvent ion of alcohol and narcot ic 
addict ion
                                              
261
 The subvent ions have not  been separated 
from each other in the government ’ s budget 
proposals. 
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